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*FOREWORD* GABRIELA MARIN THORNTON, FACULTY ADVISOR  
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European Military  
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# FOREWORD

In the 21st century, the European Union faces a host of challenges ranging from the integration of the Union's military industries to issues of migration, energy policy, and environmental security. The proposed EU Reformed Treaty could become reality in 2008. If this happens, European cohesiveness will increase, and the EU's presence and leadership in the international arena will reach new levels. A secure and more assertive Europe will be able to do more in order to help stabilize troubled regions of the world. It will be able to continue more effectively its fight against international terrorism, proliferation of WMD and failed states. Nevertheless, fostering a better transatlantic relationship remains one of the EU's top priorities. The 2003 EU Security Strategy states that: "One of the core elements of the international system is the transatlantic relationship. This is not only in our bilateral interest but strengthens the international community as a whole". The EU and the US continue to share important common interests and values, and, by the same token, they also face common security challenges. In an age of international terrorism, the willingness of the two sides to collaborate in the area of intelligence can increase the detection and disruption of communications between or among international terrorist organizations. Together the two sides are also called upon to respond to climate change challenges, to stop human rights violations, and bring security and stability in the world.

The Atlantic Affairs Journal is intended as the meeting-place of the graduate student communities concerned with, or interested in, the future of the transatlantic relationship. The Journal is edited by graduate students for graduate students. The journal publishes original research and policy oriented papers addressing multiple aspects of the transatlantic relationship. This issue deals with several important themes. It addresses the EU energy policy in international context; it explores the European Security and Defense Policy and its relationship with NATO and the US; it raises questions about Turkish membership in the Union, and it highlights the EU's work with different international organizations. The editors of this journal welcome any suggestions from scholars and policy makers that could contribute to making this journal a better and more prolific academic and policy forum. We also take this opportunity to thank those who answered our "call for papers".

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# CAMPUS CORNER

From its beginning, European Union membership has meant that a nation surrenders some national autonomy in exchange for supranational economies of scale. The expected costs and benefits of this tradeoff have been particularly salient in the areas of strategic resources, national defense, and foreign policy. While many of the earliest successes of what is now the EU occurred in the area of strategic resources, successful integration in the latter two areas has proceeded at glacial speeds. This has been the case for two main reasons: the nation-defining nature of defense and foreign policy issues, and the pre-existing ties with countries outside of Europe.

This second point remains key. Transatlantic relationships loom large in both European and American considerations of strategic resources, national defense, and foreign policy. In the short run, the nations of the EU and the United States often find themselves as competitors despite a basic certainty that in the long run their common interests will bind them together in the face of any serious threat. It is perhaps due to this assurance that we are able to coexist in a constant state of rhetorical antagonism.

As the European Union continues to consider closer integration of defense and foreign policies, it remains natural for US observers to monitor closely and sometimes nervously these developments. But this interest flows both ways. If the United States were to consider overhauling the basic organization of its defense and foreign policy-making structures, EU observers also would watch such developments closely and with some degree of suspicion and skepticism. The strength of the political, economic, and cultural ties that stretch across the Atlantic Ocean means that both sides will continue to be interested observers of such developments.

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# CAN'T WE ALL JUST GET ALONG? WHY A EUROPEAN DEFENSE AND SECURITY POLICY IS UNLIKELY TO DAMAGE THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE

We have experienced over the past 15 years a great deal of momentum in the establishment of an integrated European defense policy. The end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union brought about considerable changes to the strategic security interests of the United States as well as that of its European allies. The elimination of the greatest threat to European security initiated a drive within the region to implement a cooperative European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) that will allow the European Union (EU) to face the new threats of the 21st century. Efforts to establish ESDP are not only expected to alter the strategic security environment of Europe, they are also expected to have an impact on one of the most important relationships in the international stage, that of the United States and Europe.

The Transatlantic relationship, since the conclusion of World War II, was cemented by exceptionally high levels of cooperation. Fear of communist expansion from the East led to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 and an alignment of strategic goals between the United States and its European allies. To many, ESDP represents a transition from the Cold War environment to a new order where the alliances and relationships of the past will be transformed to accommodate new geo-strategic interests. ESDP symbolizes many different things to many different people. Within this pool of opinions there are a significant group of analysts, authors and key political figures that, for a number of reasons, believe ESDP represents a serious threat to the integrity of the Transatlantic relationship. These individuals, however, have overestimated the impact ESDP will have on the strong US-European bond. While the creation of an integrated European defense policy will undoubtedly continue to bring about some changes in the international arena, these shifts will not be as dramatic as perceived by certain critics and the Transatlantic alliance will ultimately endure.

## HISTORICAL PROGRESSION OF ESDP

The concept of a collective security policy for European states did not simply emerge during the 1990's after the conclusion of the Cold War. Efforts to establish an independent European defense capability originated in the early 1950's in response to the Soviet threat and the invasion of South Korea by its communist neighbor, North Korea. As a result of increasing fears that war might break out with the Soviet Union, the United States suggested the remilitarization of West Germany as a way to harness additional European resources to defend against a possible communist invasion from the east. Naturally, considerable apprehension existed among the French and other European nations who had suffered greatly due to historical German militarism and WWII. The West Germans themselves viewed the idea of rearmament uneasily as well. As the war in Korea raged on and China joined the fray, France and the other West European states eventually came to the realization that West German remilitarization was a necessity.<sup>1</sup>

The solution devised for dealing with a newly armed West Germany involved the concept of a European Defense Community (EDC).<sup>2</sup> Proposed by the French Prime Minister, René Plevin, the EDC was designed as a joint European defense

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force which included West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Rather than having West Germany become a part of NATO, it would remain answerable and under the control of the EDC command structure. Konrad Adenauer, the first Chancellor of West Germany, agreed to the plan. He then had the treaties that had been signed in May 1952, ratified by the Bundestag. The future of the EDC, however, was ultimately doomed to failure. The plan came to a crashing halt when in 1954 the National Assembly, France's Parliament, refused to ratify the EDC treaties. A combination of France's unwillingness to place its troops under foreign control, and its continued fear of German remilitarization ended the nascent EDC.<sup>3</sup>

As the years progressed, the concept of an independent European military force within the NATO membership structure was often addressed by different US administrations. On many occasions the United States verbally announced its support for the creation of such a structure. President Kennedy proclaimed the importance of creating a "European Pillar" within the NATO alliance. While the US verbally supported the concept of a "European Pillar" its policies were not likely to bolster the creation of an independent European alliance. As one author explains,

"At best, American support for European defense tended to be ambivalent... However, whenever Europeans make too many noises about security flexibility, Washington tends to pull back for fear that NATO, the crown jewel of American foreign policy, will be damaged and America will lose influence in the continent."<sup>4</sup>

This lack of steadfast US support for an independent defense capability along with the slow progress of European integration during the Cold War voided any chance for the creation of a "European pillar" president Kennedy urged for during his presidency.<sup>5</sup>

It was not until the 1990's that Europe once again made a serious effort to establish an independent European defense capability. As a result of a 1963 treaty between France and Germany that promised a closer political relationship, exchange of military personnel, and cooperation on matters related to defense industry, a brigade-sized Franco-German

military force was created in 1991. A few months later, in May 1992, President Mitterrand of France and Chancellor Kohl of Germany announced the integration of this force with those of five other Western European Union (WEU) states to create the Eurocorps.<sup>6</sup> This European force grew to include up to 50,000 troops. However, its apparently large size and the Eurocorps themselves ended up being more of an illusion than a viable military force. As noted author Robert Wilkie explains, "The numbers of this Eurocorps were fictitious in that they were drawn from numbers already committed to NATO, and subsequent developments have rendered even this effort extinct."<sup>7</sup>

The creation and ultimate failure of the Eurocorps to establish an independent European defense capability was followed by a landmark event in the development of ESDP. In 1992, during a WEU summit at the Petersberg Hotel in Bonn, Germany, representatives from 15 states committed the European community to attaining the capacity for conducting a wide spectrum of different security-related operations. It was agreed at this summit that the WEU would acquire the capability to conduct humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and combat unit tasks in crisis management environments. The commitments made by the WEU at the Petersberg Hotel were incorporated in 1997 into the Treaty on the European Union.

In 1996 at the European Union's Berlin Ministerial Conference, the Clinton Administration announced the United States' support for the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI).<sup>8</sup> The reason for this support can be explained through Washington's hopes that ESDI would "redistribute defense costs and military responsibilities for peacekeeping and crisis management among NATO members."<sup>9</sup> The United States recommended the creation of two joint task forces within the NATO infrastructure. Both proposed task forces would use forward deployable NATO headquarters for operational command. One of these forces would remain under the command of a US military officer and possess considerable American resources. The other task force would be commanded by a European officer and be comprised primarily of European personnel. This force would also retain the ability to access American NATO resources if the need arose.<sup>10</sup> This recommendation on the part of the Clinton Administration demonstrated

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America's support for ESDP as long as it remained integrated within NATO and not as an independent military force.

The argument over whether ESDP should exist within a NATO/Transatlantic alliance framework played a critical role on the development of Europe's defense policy. Differing views in this matter between two of the EU's most powerful members, France and Great Britain, had and still possess enormous influence on the direction of an integrated European defense policy. France has been the driving force for ESDP among EU members. While the French understand the importance NATO represents for Europe and does not want the United States to withdraw its security interests from the European continent, it believes a strong independent European military force could increase the amount of influence Europe has within NATO, bringing the EU up to par with the US.<sup>11</sup> France, which resents the level of influence the US has on European security, follows a Federalist approach to ESDP. As one author explains, "At the other extreme, federalists, headed by France and Benelux, favor a supranational ESDP that excludes the US from European security arrangements."<sup>12</sup> As a result, the French wish to create a European military capability independent of NATO structures.

The French wish to achieve a number of different objectives through their version of ESDP. First, they hope to improve European military capabilities. Through increased cooperation between EU states in the defense industry sector, France expects to improve the technology gap and strategic deficiencies which exists between the EU and the United States. Second, they want to create an independent and capable set of ESDP structures outside of the NATO infrastructure. These separate structures will allow the EU greater decision-making power and influence over European security matters, especially when there is no interest on the part of the United States to get involved. The third objective is the establishment of the Rapid Reaction Force separate from NATO. Lastly, according to Neil Winn, author of "Towards a Common European Security and Defense Policy," France wants to align EU along the Federalist line of thought causing ESDP to become "a French-led military force in world politics that is separate from America and NATO."<sup>13</sup>

Great Britain ascribes to a very different view on ESDP than France. Until the 1999 NATO bombing of Kosovo, the UK was not actively engaged in promoting ESDP within the European Union. As will be explained a little later, the lessons learned from the crisis in Kosovo would somewhat alter the British perspective on ESDP which were ambivalent at best. The UK wants to retain the US as a key strategic partner in Europe and has attempted to do so by keeping the Atlantic alliance as the prominent figure for European security. Britain's close relationship with the United States, due to historical and linguistic ties, has made it as an intermediary force between America and the rest of Europe. The UK has exploited this special relationship with America as a means to balance the influence of its European continental neighbors by acting as a mediator between them. As one author explains, "There are several important reasons for Britain's enduring commitment to the special relationship with the US, but perhaps the most urgent of these is the leverage it gives the UK in bending EU policies toward British interests."<sup>14</sup>

Because of all these factors, Great Britain has been unwilling to promote an ESDP plan that seeks to decrease US influence within Europe. British Defense Secretary Geoffrey Hoon declared that the UK viewed the concept of a European military force as an instrument to be used for conflict management only when NATO remained unwilling to involve itself. Additionally, the UK has consistently asserted the viewpoint that it considers NATO to be the main European security alliance as well as the first option for dealing with security threats.<sup>15</sup> In this respect, Great Britain expects ESDP and the RRF to supplement and bolster the capabilities of NATO and strengthen the Transatlantic alliance rather than duplicate many of its structures and resources or compete against it on a global stage.

December 1998 proved to be a landmark period for ESDP. British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac issued the Joint Declaration on European Defense in St. Malo, France, which called for the establishment of a European Defense Force. The declaration was in many senses a call to action for quickening the pace for establishing a common defense policy. According to a RAND publication on ESDP, "The St. Malo declaration was widely examined for what it included and what it left out. Indeed, its constructions permitted a wide range of

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interpretations, and those by British and French officials began emphasizing different parts of the declaration.”<sup>16</sup> Two issues which failed to be mentioned in the declaration were the assertion of NATO’s primacy, as previously consented to in the Berlin-Brussels agreements, and the idea of ESDP being present within a NATO framework. Two important aspects that were addressed included the statement that EU military operations would occur only in the absence of NATO’s involvement and that careful measures would be taken to prevent “unnecessary duplication” of NATO structures and resources.<sup>17</sup>

The British change of heart regarding ESDP involved an attempt on the UK’s part to establish itself as a cooperative and supportive member of the EU. As is illustrated in a RAND study on ESDP, the St. Malo declaration came weeks before the launching of the Euro, the European Union’s integrated currency. Great Britain, due to political and economic objections, was 1 of 4 EU countries out of 15 at the time not to support or adopt the EU’s new integrated currency. Tony Blair’s policy reverse on the matter of ESDP reflected attempts on the part of Great Britain to make itself a visible and supportive member of the European Union in the wake of its recent rejection of the Euro currency.<sup>18</sup>

Four days after the St. Malo announcement, the Clinton Administration expressed its views on the current development of ESDP. At a NATO foreign ministers meeting, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright expressed that the United States supported Europe’s drive to increase its military capabilities and create a common defense strategy to deal with European security issues.<sup>19</sup> Albright did, however, reveal Washington’s concerns over possible challenges ESDP could present. These worries were expressed by the Secretary of State in what would be known as the “three Ds.” According to author Peter Van Ham, “Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s famous ‘three Ds’ illustrate these concerns: the USA does not want a decoupling of Europe’s security from that of America’s; no duplication of effort and capabilities; and no discrimination against those allies who are not within the EU.”<sup>20</sup>

Essentially, the United States remained apprehensive that ESDP could create a considerably different European perspective on defense and security-related issues that would

separate or “decouple” it from the United States. Washington also demonstrated concern that a European Security and Defense Policy would expend limited European resources in creating structures that possessed similar functions and capabilities as NATO, when the EU could simply use NATO structures themselves. Duplication was not only a waste of resources; it could potentially divert scarce European assets originally promised to NATO away from Atlantic alliance. Lastly, the Clinton Administration remained anxious over the possibility that ESDP and future EU operations might lead to the exclusion of non-EU NATO allies such as Canada, the US, Norway, Iceland, and Turkey.<sup>21</sup> Though all three of Secretary Albright’s concerns had been expressed at some point or another prior to the NATO foreign ministers meeting, the increased probability that ESDP would become a reality in the near future prompted the Clinton Administration to publicly voice its anxiety to the European community.

Support within the European Union and the United States for the concept of a European Security and Defense Policy received another critical boost between 24 March and 10 June, 1999 during the crisis in Kosovo and the NATO bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The NATO campaign to halt atrocities committed against the Albanian Kosovo population represented an eye-opening event for many European states, especially France and Britain. Both these states hoped to “play a major role” in the political and military resolution of the European crisis. Yet, once military operations began, they discovered that they lacked the necessary strategic and military capabilities to fulfill the large role they had committed themselves to. Instead, France and Great Britain, along with other European NATO allies, discovered how reliant they actually were on the United States for defense capabilities.<sup>22</sup>

During the Kosovo campaign, the United States reluctantly assumed a leading role in the planning and implementation of military operations against the forces of Slobodan Milosevic and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Estimates of NATO member military expenditures approximate US costs at \$5 billion in comparison to \$2 billion for the rest of NATO’s European members. The considerable gap in military expenses between the United States and European NATO allies was due to the fact that American aircraft conducted over 65% of the



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bombing missions during the Kosovo campaign.<sup>23</sup> This disparity in the amount of assets used did not represent unwillingness on the part of European allies to expend resources to solve the Kosovo crisis; rather, it represented the technology and military gap that existed between America and its European NATO partners.<sup>24</sup> As one author explains:

The other turning point for the Europeans was the Kosovo air war, which underlined that the USA had superior intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, plentiful precision-guided munitions, massive air- and sealift sources, modern communications, and solid logistics. The Kosovo experience demonstrated that European states – despite years of talk and paperwork – still could not back up their economic and diplomatic prowess with military means.<sup>25</sup>

Because of this capabilities gap and the amount of invested US resources, the United States ultimately wielded the greatest amount of influence when it came to deciding the course of the Kosovo campaign.

The crisis in Kosovo in many senses reestablished the hopes and desires that ESDP symbolized for different members of the NATO alliance. For the United States and Great Britain, Kosovo reminded them of the importance that ESDP represented for developing a European defense capability able to deal with regional crises the United States did not wish to involve itself in. For France, Kosovo was a reminder of the extraordinary influence the United States and NATO had within the European political and security sphere. ESDP symbolized a way to reduce this influence and increase the European Union's position and role on the global stage.<sup>26</sup>

During NATO's Washington Summit in April 1999, the United States and European allies hammered out the Berlin-Plus agreement. This conference served to negotiate a number of arrangements between ESDP and its future relationship with the NATO alliance. First, the United States and NATO established that the European Union would become the primary instrument in charge of ESDP, rather than the WEU. Second, Berlin-Plus assured the EU access to NATO planning capabilities and military assets, depending on their availability. Third, the agreement asserted the "primacy" of NATO, in

addition to promises of avoiding "unnecessary duplication" of structures and capabilities. The fourth agreement reached under Berlin-Plus stated that NATO members not integrated within the EU would be engaged into ESDP. Lastly, a consensus was reached determining that European Union would only conduct operations in situations where NATO was not already engaged.<sup>27</sup> In many ways, the agreements made under Berlin-Plus seemed to assuage many of the concerns the United States had about the future of ESDP. America's anxieties, however, would once again be rekindled a short period later.

A little over a month after the Berlin-Plus agreement, tensions over ESDP and its relationship with NATO reemerged. The United States' trust of its European allies was shaken after the Cologne European Council. Documents relaying future plans for an integrated European defense policy failed to contain much of the earlier language that instituted NATO's primacy. As illustrated in a RAND publication on ESDP, "There was nothing about building ESDI/ESDP within NATO, about acting only where NATO was engaged, about protecting the requirements of NATO action or the coherence of the command chain, or about avoiding unnecessary duplication."<sup>28</sup> America responded by adopting two non-binding resolutions within Congress and the Senate detailing US concerns about ESDP and the future of the Transatlantic relationship. These resolutions served as a warning to Europe to "tread carefully" with the development of ESDP and that possible consequences existed if they strayed too far from the US-suggested guidelines for a common defense policy.<sup>29</sup>

One of the most, if not the most, important steps for ESDP occurred in December, 1999 at the Helsinki EU Summit. During this landmark meeting, President Chirac of France and Prime Minister Tony Blair of Great Britain presented the "Headline Goals" to create a viable force with deployment and sustainability capabilities able to fulfill the full spectrum of duties outlined in the Petersberg Tasks.<sup>30</sup> The announcement established that, by 2003, the EU would create a 50,000-60,000 man Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), capable of deploying within 60 days and possessing the ability to sustain itself for up to one year. Additionally, the "Headline Goals" outlined the equipment that would be necessary to create a joint European military force which included approximately

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500 aircraft and 15 ships.<sup>31</sup> Also included in the “Headline Goals” was an agreement to create new political and military entities within the European Council that could provide the EU with necessary political and strategic guidance. This eventually led to the establishment of a Political and Security Committee (PSC) expected to determine the strategic and political direction of EU operations; a Military Committee (MC) comprised of EU military representatives tasked with advising the PCS on military matters; and finally a Military Staff (MS) “to provide the EU council with military expertise and support for CESDP.”<sup>32</sup> Blair and Chirac’s declaration of the “Headline Goals” at the Helsinki Summit gave new life to ESDP and made its heavily debated creation a certainty.

The command of possible EU missions was a topic of considerable interest for all parties of the Transatlantic alliance. The dual possibility of EU autonomous action without the use NATO assets as well the chance of a NATO-sanctioned EU operation which used NATO resources created scenarios where different command policies needed to be outlined. It was determined that the best way to address this question involved the creation of two different leadership appointment systems. Ultimately, command of possible EU military operations was dependant on the requirements of the mission as well as the parties and resources involved in the operation. In order to adhere to the EU/NATO shared resources arrangements in the Berlin-Plus agreement, different contingency plans have been established. If the mission requires the use of NATO assets, operational command in most cases will be under a high-ranking European military officer holding a high position within NATO, typically, the Deputy Supreme Allied Command Europe. In other scenarios where an EU military operation is conducted without NATO resources, operational command is to be given to a high-ranking officer from the European state with the most vested resources in the mission.<sup>33</sup> This process for selecting mission commanders has been acknowledged and accepted as a viable policy by all members of the EU and NATO.

Following the announcement of the “Headline Goals” the newly elected Bush Administration followed in the footsteps of his predecessors and proclaimed America’s support for ESDP. He declared that, “The United States welcomes the European Union’s Security and Defense Policy

(ESDP), aiming at making Europe a stronger, more capable partner in deterring and managing crises affecting the security of the Transatlantic community.”<sup>34</sup> President Bush continued to emphasize the importance of developing ESDP in a “coordinated, compatible, and transparent” context with NATO. He also reiterated how critical it was for Europe to include non-EU members as possible allies for future operations.

On May 20, 2003 in Brussels, the EU Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) was declared fully operational. Although declared operational, key representatives clearly stated that significant shortcomings remained and that strategic airlift and sealift capabilities were deficient.<sup>35</sup> Additionally, while most European states generally met their troop commitments for the RRF, there was “significant concern about their overall readiness and training as well as their dual-hatted assignments to both the EU and NATO.”<sup>36</sup> Despite these issues, elements of the RRF were soon deployed on its first military operation to the Former Democratic Republic of Congo (FDRC).

The EU has conducted a number of missions in regions such as the Balkans, the Middle East, Africa, and the Caucasus. There have been only 3 military operations conducted by elements of the RRF, one in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and two others in the FDRC. These missions were all relatively small in size and either done with the support of NATO assets or under the legitimacy of a UN Security Council mandate.<sup>37</sup> The effectiveness of the operations remains debatable.

KEY ARGUMENTS WHY ESDP AND THE RRF ARE  
BAD FOR THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE

Certain critics of ESDP believe that it poses a number of different threats to the Atlantic alliance and will ultimately have negative impact on the relationship between the United States and its European allies. The threats ESDP poses to the alliance range from turning the EU into a competitor intent on balancing American power, to the destruction of the very important US-European defense trading market. In total there are seven key arguments geared towards explaining how ESDP may seriously damage the Transatlantic alliance.

The first argument asserting ESDP is bad for the Transatlantic relationship implies that the

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European collective defense agreement is designed as a way to balance American hegemony on the global stage. These critics ascribe to the French, or federalist, vision of ESDP which eliminates Europe's dependence on the United States and elevates their power status to that of America's. One author explains this fear:

"A third reason for building ESDP – one that has grown in importance since the late 1990s – is to gain 'autonomy' from Washington. In this view, ESDP is part of a broader attempt to counter-balance American 'hyper-power'. There is a growing sense among Europeans that if they wish to seriously influence US policy, they can do so only by building greater military capabilities."<sup>38</sup>

The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 is believed by many to have strengthened the resolve of many European nations to find a means to counter American unilateralism. The inability of some European states, such as France, to dissuade the US from invading Iraq left, in some senses, as deep an impression on Europe as the 1999 NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo did years earlier. Powerful European states were once again reminded of the inordinate amount of power the United States wielded in world politics and, according to many ESDP critics, motivated to rectify the situation.<sup>39</sup> Political realist, Dr. Christopher Layne illustrates this point when he claimed that "If the European Union (EU) fulfills ESDP's longer-term goals, it will emerge as an independent strategic player in world politics. The clear objective of investing Europe with the capacity to brake US hegemonic aspirations will have driven that emergence."<sup>40</sup>

The second argument critics use to claim ESDP will damage the Transatlantic alliance is that EU efforts to gain autonomy from their reliance on US/NATO assets will establish a European "defense pillar" outside of NATO, therefore wasting valuable resources on duplicate structures and equipment.<sup>41</sup> Duplication may not only lead to wasted resources, but could also cause European Union NATO allies to divert promised troops, pulling commanding staff and materiel away from NATO to be used for the RRF and ESDP. The current Bush administration expressed great fear that "CESDP will lead resources to be spent on separate CESDP structures away from NATO at a time when the US is calling for even

greater European contributions to the Atlantic Alliance. If this scenario comes about, which is not highly unlikely, a paradigm shift in Transatlantic relations will emerge."<sup>42</sup>

A situation that illustrates the fear of Europe pulling away resources from NATO during a time of need and diverting them to an EU military can be seen in Afghanistan. Ongoing military operations in Afghanistan, as of 2006, were all placed under the direction of the UN-sanctioned International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which is a NATO-led force. Approximately 30,000 troops from 35 different countries are currently under the command of NATO conducting the alliance's largest military operation outside of Europe to date.<sup>43</sup> Afghanistan represents the situation that the Bush Administration feared. US resources are spread thin between the war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Continued and possibly increased support from NATO allies is essential for success in Afghanistan. If European allies decrease their share of NATO resources because of ESDP, the Transatlantic relationship could be visibly disrupted.

The third threat posed to the Transatlantic alliance by ESDP, according to critics, is that ESDP will turn an autonomous European military force into a competitor of NATO, especially if the European Commission rejects the idea of a NATO "first refusal" policy. Peter Van Hamm of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies claims that "In the future, Europe may well be capable of taking autonomous military action without recourse to NATO and even without first asking the USA to get involved. This is a scenario which Washington fears may provoke a trans-Atlantic decoupling and spell the end of NATO as we know it."<sup>44</sup>

Fear that ESDP will instill within the EU a "regional minimalist/reductionist" point of view that may spread throughout European NATO allies is the fourth danger posed by critics.<sup>45</sup> The United States is very interested that Europe keeps a similar perspective on global security matters. Europeans have been accused by Americans of having a lax stance on certain security issues, such as high technology transfers and export control, the United States felt were crucial for global security. Some critics of ESDP are anxious the new EU defense policy will spread this attitude to all European NATO member states.

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The end of the Cold War eliminated Europe's greatest, and in some peoples' views only, threat. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought about an "absence of immediate and unambiguous security threats."<sup>46</sup> Most of Europe responded by focusing their efforts on integration and the improvement of their economies while decreasing the amount of resources spent on defense. Van Ham explains that since 1992 European defense spending has dropped by 22%.<sup>47</sup> It is precisely this minimalist perspective critics claim will swell within the ranks of EU/NATO member states embittering the United States as it shoulders more of the security burden.

The fifth concern involving ESDP and its impact on the Transatlantic alliance is that increased rhetoric, especially on the part of European federalists, about liberating the EU from overwhelming US influence may convince key American figures and Congress that it no longer wants or needs the United States as a security partner. As author Neil Winn illustrates, there is a contingent of "ultra-hawkish conservative" representatives from the southern states of the United States that recommend the US withdraw from Europe due to the diminished threat to the region and global security since the end of the Cold War.<sup>48</sup>

Concerns also exist over trading relationships between the United States and Europe, specifically in the armaments industry. The United States benefits financially from the European defense industry and has bolstered its good relationship with the region through the lucrative trade of defense products. America's position at the very top tier of the world's defense technology market has given it a distinct advantage in the weapons trade over its European allies. In 1997, the United States sold \$4.3 billion in defense products to European nations. In contrast, European arms sales to the US that year totaled only \$900 million. Since the landmark declaration made at St. Malo, however, there has been a noticeable increase in the amount of defense contracts awarded to European companies by other EU states.<sup>49</sup> Those who believe ESDP will turn out to be harmful to the Transatlantic relationship claim that the new defense policy will ultimately close the European defense market to the United States as EU states integrate their defense industries and increase armaments trade between themselves. This situation would create the impression of a "fortress Europe" scenario where the EU followed a policy intended to keep non-EU goods and businesses outside of the Union.<sup>50</sup>

The merger of German company Daimler Chrysler DASA and France's Aerospatiale Matra SA to create the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS) in 1999 was a big step towards European competition with the United States and validated many critics' fears of America losing access to the EU defense market. EADS quickly became one of the top defense companies in the market competing against US rivals Boeing and Lockheed Martin.<sup>51</sup> Europe's decision to contract EADS as their primary source for developing the EU military force strategic airlift capabilities, which they were and continue to be seriously deficient in, represented a considerable loss for its rival US companies. The development of the A400M Airbus transport aircraft, EADS' version of Lockheed's C-130 Hercules, is a key example of the marginalization of US defense products America is worried about.<sup>52</sup>

The final concern expressed by critics of ESDP is one that has been mirrored by the Bush Administration. According to one author,

The Bush Administration is worried that ESDP will create artificial divisions and distinctions among NATO allies, undermining NATO's political cohesion. France and the more federal-minded members of the EU will increasingly demand loyalty tests to the European integration project. This might create division in NATO between Atlanticist and European states.<sup>53</sup>

The United States does not want ESDP to act like a solvent that dissolves the glue holding NATO together. European integration can be used as a powerful tool to sway nations that maintain aligned security policies with the United States away from this relationship as a means to show their preference for the European Union.

In some senses, an example of this shift of policies to show solidarity with the European Union was demonstrated by Great Britain in 1998 at the St. Malo Summit. Although the NATO campaign in Kosovo would play a large part in the UK's change of heart over ESDP, as previously mentioned, Tony Blair also shifted Great Britain's stance on ESDP because of his nation's rejection of the Euro. As a way of showing Britain's commitment to the EU, especially after it had rejected the Union's

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integrated monetary policy, Blair surprised the United States as well as many other nations by declaring full British support for ESDP.

COUNTERARGUMENTS: WHY ESDP WILL NOT HAVE SUCH A DRAMATIC IMPACT OF TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

The above mentioned arguments are legitimate ones which deserve some consideration. However, most people who view ESDP as a serious threat to the Transatlantic alliance fail to acknowledge the realities surrounding the US-European relationship and significantly overestimate the impact ESDP may have on the Transatlantic alliance. There are a number of factors that ultimately diminish the overall negative effect ESDP might have on the EU's relationship with the United States.

One of these factors is that the divisions critics fear ESDP may create among European NATO allies already exist and have been present for quite some time. Not only do these divisions exist, they prevent ESDP from becoming a competitor to US hegemony and the NATO alliance. This can simply be seen by the different perspectives and goals the three most powerful members of the EU have for ESDP. As mentioned earlier, Great Britain wants to keep a strong American presence and security interest in the European continent. The UK hopes to use ESDP structures and resources to supplement NATO as well as to conduct operations when the NATO/US is unwilling or incapable of doing so. The French on the other hand want to duplicate many of the institutions and capabilities available within NATO to marginalize the influence the US has in European security affairs and to decrease the EU's dependence on American resources. One author explains "the French government likes to refer to the ESDP as 'Defense Europe' and focuses on missions the EU can manage without NATO, while the British government focuses on missions the Europeans can do within a NATO framework."<sup>54</sup> These different interests, which have existed for some time, are present throughout the EU causing a division among federalist and minimalist states.

Germany represents a special case that bears separate examination. German historical experiences of the 20th century have created within the state a unique outlook towards ESDP

which differs from other EU members. This perspective was explained by Dr. Christian Tuschoff of the Free University of Berlin in a lecture titled German Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defense Policy. Dr. Tuschoff stated that Germany remains apprehensive of broadening its military role and capabilities to support the EU's drive for a comprehensive and unified European defense policy. The nation's experience during the rise of Hitler and the outbreak of WWII inflicted deep scars in the German population's psyche. This fear of German militarism has resulted in the suppression of nationalist sentiment within the population. The European Union's call to increase its military capacity beyond a defensive one, in order to supplement ESDP, has, according to Dr. Tuschoff, "rung a great deal of bells" in the heads of the German people. There exists an understandable fear that further militarization of Germany could somehow grow out of control. As a result of these concerns, two safeguards have been designed to control the use of German military resources. The first safeguard requires German Parliamentary approval for any EU, UN or NATO military action involving German troops. The second safeguard is a declaration stating that Germany cannot use its military unilaterally. Essentially, the German military can only be used for defensive purposes or by a UN mandate.<sup>55</sup> These restrictions on the use of the German military along with its unique perspective create further division among the European Union's three most powerful members.

France, Great Britain, and Germany demonstrate that some forms of division among European NATO members already exist. It is these divisions, however, that will ultimately decrease ESDP potential to disrupt the Transatlantic relationship. If you take into account German apprehensiveness about ESDP along with Great Britain's expectations of maintaining any European defense policy as supplemental to NATO, it is highly unlikely we will see ESDP develop along federalist guidelines as an independent competitor to the US and NATO.

Another factor seriously limiting the chance that ESDP will strain the alliance between Europe and the United States is the strategic and technology gap between American military resources and the Europeans' Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). Author Daniele Riggio claims that in the EU's case, "Capabilities needed to fulfill the

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twenty-first century's security requirements have not been fully developed and they and they cannot be expected to have an operational impact in the immediate future." This is due mostly to Europe's large technological gap vis-à-vis the United States in specific strategic areas.<sup>56</sup>

This capabilities gap, especially in the areas of force projection, seriously limits the European Union's ability to match the United State's levels of influence in the global arena. Efforts are being made to overcome these deficiencies through the procurement of new weapon technology and transport platforms; however, the Europeans' ability to accomplish this is being hindered by another factor, political will.

One of the biggest reasons ESDP is unlikely to turn the EU military into a competitor of NATO or eliminate European reliance on the United States to deal with major security threats is because they are unwilling and, in some senses, incapable of appropriating the funding necessary for effective ESDP and the creation of a viable rapid reaction force. The gap in military expenditures between the United States and Europe is very large. One author points out that "in 2000, US defense expenditures reached \$280.8 billion, topping the military spending of all EU members combined."<sup>57</sup> This disparity has grown even greater after the attacks of 9/11 and the US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. America spent over \$419 billion for defense in 2006, not including costs for combat operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. The European nation closest to US levels was Great Britain with \$49 billion.<sup>58</sup>

In order for ESDP to work, it is anticipated that all European Union members need to allocate 2% of their GDP for defense expenses. Currently most EU members are spending less than that and have no inclination to increase their defense budgets. Germany, considered the EU's most powerful economic member, only spent 1.5% of its GDP in 2003 and had plans to further lower this figure. As stated earlier, the end of the Cold War eliminated Europe's most obvious and eminent threat. A decrease in the perceived danger to the region precipitated a situation where "political and economic pressures are far more likely to cause decreases than increases in defense budgets."<sup>59</sup>

Considering the estimated cost for modernizing and equipping the EU's RRF was calculated at over 100 billion euros, which equaled more than

70% of what all European NATO members spent yearly in defense, it seems unlikely that Europe will manage to raise the money necessary to grant them the autonomy they want from NATO and US resources.<sup>60</sup> Missions such as those conducted in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Democratic Republic of Congo remain viable operations for ESDP. Yet, as long as EU members are unwilling to increase their defense spending, crises as large as the one in Kosovo in 1999 will remain beyond their capabilities, making their relationship with NATO and the United States as important as ever.

Another reason ESDP is unlikely to damage the Transatlantic or NATO alliance is due to the fact that the EU military infrastructure is expected to remain small, especially in relation to NATO. Peter Van Ham supports this assertion stating,

"Helsinki plans for a new Euro-Force remain modest and would do little more than enable the EU to take military action if the US does not want to be involved. For a number of years to come, any European-led military operation will still be highly dependant in NATO command structures, as well as on US intelligence and logistics (if not more)."<sup>61</sup>

The EU RRF was not designed or intended to have the capacity for fighting wars.<sup>62</sup> Because of this fact, European states will need to maintain strong ties with NATO and the United States if they wish to retain the broader military capabilities provided by the Transatlantic alliance. Additionally, the small size of the EU military force is likely to prevent autonomous action without consulting NATO and, as a means of being cost efficient, maintain duplication of NATO structures and capabilities to a minimum.

The mechanism by which EU forces are deployed is another factor that will reduce any negative impact ESDP has on the Transatlantic relationship. As previously discussed certain countries, such as Germany, require that EU operations involving their troops be approved by their own national parliament.<sup>63</sup> In cases where there is any dissent among EU members on potential operations, refusal from some could hopelessly deadlock any effective action on the Union's part.

Further complicating the ESPD deployment mechanism is the question of whether EU operations

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can be conducted without being sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council. Debates over ESDP within the EU have left this question unanswered. One author explains that, "Successive Council resolutions on ESDP leave open the question of whether an EU-led military crisis operation would be managed with or without a mandate from the United Nations' Security Council and with or without the consent of the states concerned."<sup>64</sup> Many European states may only be willing to send their forces on EU missions if a Security Council mandate is given because of the legitimacy it lends the operation and because it reinforces the integrity of international law.<sup>65</sup> Requiring such authorization makes it very difficult for ESDP to act as a balancing force against US "hyper-power" since the United States is a permanent member of the Security Council and has veto power over council decisions. Additionally, necessitating UN approval can severely hamper the decision making process for ESDP and impairs the ability of an EU force to act autonomously as a global power.

Critics' concern that ESDP will convince congress that Europe no longer wants or needs it as a security partner has mostly been negated by the 9/11 attacks and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Vicious terrorist attacks in Washington D.C., New York, Pennsylvania, Madrid, and London have inflicted destruction on both sides of the Atlantic alliance. The GWOT has reaffirmed the need on both sides to maintain cooperation on a security threat different from that of communist expansion. The European Union's Security Strategy lists the region's top five security threats as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime.<sup>66</sup> These five threats are very similar to the United States top security priorities, giving both sides more than enough common issues to continue cooperating. Further bolstering the likeliness that ESDP will not cause US Congress to abandon Europe is the idea that, "It is understood that Congress may well be more likely to continue its support for NATO if the Europeans are serious defense partners."<sup>67</sup>

Finally, critics' argument that attempts in integrating EU defense industry to sustain ESDP technology demands will lead to a "fortress Europe" mentality and eliminate American access to European defense markets is valid, yet unlikely. While European defense companies have made

advancements within the EU and global markets, the United States maintains a considerable lead in defense technology. In fact, while there has been some EU cooperation in the defense industry, integration has not progressed to the levels needed to rival the US. Neil Winn from the Institute for Politics and International Studies illustrates this point: "At present time, as we have stated above, defense procurement in Western Europe is not organized around integrated supranational structures. It is largely still driven by national public and private sector plans that are predicated on the use of US military equipment."<sup>68</sup>

The truth of the matter is that EU member-states are currently unwilling to invest the large sums of money needed to revolutionize their militaries, making NATO and the US alliance indispensable.<sup>69</sup> NATO continues to represent the only framework guaranteeing interoperability between the United States and European militaries.<sup>70</sup> Unless the EU wishes to risk losing this interoperability with American forces, and possibly fall further behind in their defense technology, ESDP will not be geared towards marginalizing US influence and the NATO relationship in the region.

## CONCLUSION

The concerns expressed over the effects ESDP may have on the Transatlantic relationship are genuine. They do, however, overestimate the capabilities a European military will possess and underestimate the strength that remains between the US-European alliance. There is no doubt that an integrated European defense policy will bring about changes both within Europe and around the globe. Yet, these changes will not be radical enough to destroy a bond forged long ago by a common history and strengthened by the threat of communism.

A combination of factors makes the likelihood that ESDP could significantly damage the Transatlantic relationship minute at best. First, the different perspectives of EU members on ESDP, especially Germany, France, and Britain, maintain longstanding divisions within the EU, preventing ESDP from establishing Union as a true competitor to the US. Second, Europe currently does not possess the combined resources to project military power around the globe, negating its position as a balancer of US "hyper-power" or as a competitor to

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NATO. Third, the EU is neither willing or capable, due to political reasons, of providing sufficient resources to ESDP to make it a threat to NATO or the Transatlantic alliance. Fourth, ESDP and the RRF are not designed or expected to reach near the size or capabilities of NATO and the American military, making duplication minimal. Fifth, the EU deployment mechanism for the RRF is currently dependent on individual member states and international institutions, affecting its ability to function autonomously and quickly. Sixth, the fact that newly prioritized security threats of the EU are shared by the US and both are active members of the GWOT, combined with the fact the EU is trying to become a better security partner, makes it highly unlikely US Congress will decide to retreat from Europe. Lastly, EU efforts to integrate their defense industry are far from preventing US companies from accessing the European market and the technology gap between the two establishes NATO as an indispensable alliance. These seven factors alone ensure that the Transatlantic relationship will continue to endure the tribulations of a changing geo-political environment and that Europe and America, while they may have their troubles, will continue get along.

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- of its financial resources to Kosovo through humanitarian and financial aid. In fact, according to the author, European allies have, over the long run, spent more money in Kosovo than the United States.
25. Van Ham, 216.
26. Penksa and Mason, 262.
27. Hunter, 53-56.
28. Ibid, 56.
29. Ibid, 59-61.
30. Ibid, 63.
31. Wilkie, 40. These numbers were increased shortly after to include an additional 100,000 troops and 85 extra ships.
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# THE FUTURE OF ESDP: FORCES AGAINST AN INDEPENDENT VIABLE EUROPEAN MILITARY

The end of the Cold War instigated numerous political changes worldwide, especially in Europe. The European Union, a marvel of integration, continues to grow and change at a rapid pace. This is especially true in the field of security as seen in CSDP, Common Security and Defense Policy, and at a smaller, but potentially more influential level, with ESDP, European Security and Defense Policy. As Europe, the EU, and its various institutions such as the ESDP continue to change, the question on the ultimate extent of ESDP begs asking. What is the likelihood of ESDP turning into an independent viable European military?

This is an important question because it influences many other factors, not only for Europe, but for the United States and greater international community. Understanding the realistic future of ESDP provides insight into the status and abilities of Europe and the EU as a whole. An independent ESDP will have major ramifications on the workings of NATO and the European role in NATO. Most importantly, the nature of the transatlantic alliance and relationship will undoubtedly change if ESDP become a standalone instrument.

To analyze and further contemplate answers to some of these questions, this paper is divided into six sections. The first will provide a brief background of ESDP, its structure and what that structure means for further development. Then the various European feelings and attitudes towards ESDP, including issues of European identity will be discussed. The third section will focus on ESDP's role within the EU. The fourth part will examine the relationship between the United States, NATO and ESDP. This will be followed with a look at the reasons an independent ESDP is improbable. Finally, some avenues for the EU to make an independent ESDP more viable will be proposed.

## CURRENT STATE OF ESDP

The European Security and Defense Policy is a method for helping member states of the European Union create a way to deal with security and defense

issues from a European perspective. This contrasts the traditional individual nation state approach. The Saint-Malo Declaration stated that ESDP forced the EU to decide on "the progressive framing of a common defense policy [for which] the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so in order to react to international crisis."<sup>1</sup> The key element here is the "framing" tool created by ESDP which helps attempts for a coherent policy.

Many ESDP scholars stress "the guiding principles behind the ESDP are pragmatic, institutional, international, multilateral, multi-level, diplomatic, rules-based, and transformative rather than strategic, coercive, self-interested, and military."<sup>2</sup> Obviously any new policy dealing with security and defense issues will make one think of hard military attributes. The debate over whether ESDP is only an institutional institution or a strategic military institution will be discussed later, however there are two basic and simplistic competing structural views of ESDP which are best explained through the contrasting British and French perspectives. Though not exhaustive, these two structural views provide enough of a contrast to understand the bigger institutional debates around ESDP.

Prime Minister Tony Blair best represents the Atlanticist school of thought, which views ESDP as a tool to strengthen further the Atlantic alliance.<sup>3</sup> In

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a speech on ESDP in 1999, Blair discussed his views of the structure of ESDP.

There is much talk of structures. But we should begin with capacities. To put it bluntly, if Europe is to have a key defense role, it needs modern forces, strategic lift and the necessary equipment to conduct a campaign... We do, however, need to see how we can cooperate better, complement each other's capabilities, have a full range of defense options open to us.<sup>4</sup>

The French perspective on the structural views of ESDP is what some call Gaullist, which sees ESDP as a European project which should make use of the already in place Atlantic system.<sup>5</sup> In other words, ESDP should be used as a mechanism to strengthen European assets by taking advantage of current arrangements to further Europe. However, as the EU continues to grow, now to a total of 27 members with the recent additions of Bulgaria and Romania, ESDP is now a significantly bigger organ than merely British or French.

Due to the great number of involved players, it is increasingly difficult to find a unanimous view of an ultimate ESDP, which has thus caused bumps. David Dunn writes, "Despite a generation of statements and gradualist moves towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), there is still no certainty about the practicability and applicability of the norms, principles, rules and decision-making procedures embodied in the European Union's claim to speak and act as a single voice."<sup>6</sup> All twenty seven members have "very different ways of contributing to international security: neutrality, non-nuclear, nuclear, full alliance membership are just four of the many options open to EU Member States and there has never been any kind of consensus regarding which was best, or which could be a common policy."<sup>7</sup> Even so, just because there are differing views between EU members does not mean that no consensus of ESDP exists.

#### EUROPEAN FEELINGS TOWARDS ESDP

Richard C. Eichenberg conducted a quantitative analytical study measuring European's feelings towards European defense integration and commitments to NATO. This data then provides a framework for

examining issues of a European identity and how such issues influence an independent ESDP.

Overall, public support for European defense in the NATO context is high, but not as high as the prospect of an independent European defense element, especially free from influence of the United States. Eichenberg finds "public support for European foreign and defense policy integration is surprisingly high....second, support for NATO also remains high, although there are indications that support for European security integration does weaken support for NATO, and there is strong sentiment in Europe for the EU to have a dominant decision-making voice in security policy."<sup>8</sup> However, while the majority would be in favor of an independent secure Europe, many "consider [NATO] essential to European security."<sup>9</sup> Then there is a significant majority who want both a separate European defense system, but within the context of NATO, "as reflected in NATO's 1996 compromise in which the European Defense Identity is acknowledged and even endorsed, but only within the context of NATO."<sup>10</sup> In essence this data shows that Europeans still have a favorable opinion of its current security status and relationship with NATO, but are becoming increasingly more favorable to the thought of a separate European defense apparatus.

These results illuminate an underlying question about European identity. This is an overarching theme in all of the European Union's integration efforts is the issue identity and making decisions with a unified voice. In regards to defense policy, the "European Union is seeking to create its own distinct and separable, if not separate, European Security and Defense Policy,"<sup>11</sup> which would be separate from NATO. "Rather than seeking to duplicate or supplant NATO, The European Union is seeking a security and defense identity, not for deterrence or defense, but to promote a European political identity. For "Europe to be Europeans" the European Union needs a foreign and security policy to differentiate itself from US foreign and security policy with which it is so intertwined."<sup>12</sup> Making this decision however will require a major step forward in how the member countries identify themselves and their interests. It is important to note "that this question on 'EU versus national' decision making in defense is a very demanding one, for it reminds citizens not just of the substance of the policy

challenge (security and defense) but also of the sacrifice of national sovereignty.”<sup>13</sup>

Recent endeavors by the EU show this gap in decision making. Examples include events in “Yugoslavia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq-in addition to those on 11 September-have highlighted a perceived growing gap between the military capabilities of the United States and Europe. Europe, in the form of the EU, is constrained by national interests, unwieldy multilateral structures, and different military traditions. These events also revealed the vulnerabilities of a large, multi-member coalition of states. In short, Europe has a contest vision of itself.”<sup>14</sup> There seems to be a great number of factors all influencing and pulling Europe in many different directions. Are there too many factors pulling in different directions to create a cohesive ESDP policy? In a word, yes. However, to understand reasons why, one must examine ESDP’s role within the EU.

#### ESDP WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Originally, ESDP was created to follow a certain path: “external crisis management using military capabilities”<sup>15</sup>. While this may have been the initial purpose for ESDP, its perceived use has broadened within the EU community to include internal crisis management. Whether or not it has the capabilities and legitimacy to do so, is another issue is another factor to explore.

Using ESDP for internal security matters has positive attributes and potential for further coordination within the EU, especially in the realms of humanitarian missions and terrorist prevention and other related issues. It seems an inefficient use of resources and greater potential of miscommunication in regards to terrorist threats if the security apparatus for the EU externally has no role internally. From an ESDP perspective, “there is a logic to placing greater emphasis on the internal-external dimensions of security since European citizens have expressed their concerns about the general threats, posed by organized crime, terrorism, and illegal migration issues.”<sup>16</sup> This shows that any of these issues listed “will confront the EU with complicated challenges that are likely to demand a response that is neither solely military nor civilian or, for that matter, solely in the domain of the Community of CFSP.”<sup>17</sup> Coordination

between states and the supranational organization, especially with intelligence is necessary and should be encouraged. Coordination “makes it clear that regular coordination, the exchange of information and personnel between the pillars (in this case primarily the Community, the ‘third pillar’ or Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters and the member states is essential in the formulation of a comprehensive approach to a threat.”<sup>18</sup>

Seeing how internal and external uses can be beneficial for ESDP, some initial notions of new doctrines and ideas of how to better use resources have surfaced. One idea is the creation of standard operating procedures. “Amongst the many suggestions made, the need for an Operational Manual on EU emergency and crisis coordination is actually one of the more helpful suggestions since it immediately focuses minds on issues of consistency as well as the nexus between internal and external security concerns.”<sup>19</sup> Further, some feel that “overlapping capacities found in the various pillars may eventually lead to consolidation”<sup>20</sup>. Most heartening are the reports that “analysts remained practically unanimous in concluding that new challenges strengthen rather than weaken the EU’s institutions”<sup>21</sup>.

These findings present a rather rosy view of the role of ESDP in external and internal crisis management. However, there are many elements which dampen this bright view. As with any relationship, clear definitions, goals, and purposes need to be established to keep a mission on course. This is not the case with internal crisis management inside ESDP as “the development of conflict prevention and crisis management capacities within the Community as well as CFSP thus saw numerous areas of grey emerging where both pillars could legitimately claim competence. In addition to questions of legal competence, bureaucratic rivalry between the Commission and the Council also ensued.”<sup>22</sup> It seeks to combine too many elements at present to make it effective. By attempting to “incorporate diverse factors such as imbalance of political, socio-economic or cultural opportunities amongst different identity groups lack of democratic legitimacy and effectiveness of governance lack of effective mechanisms for the peaceful conciliation of group interests and the lack of a vibrant civil society.”<sup>23</sup>

Competition with internal EU institutions seems to be the biggest problem right now and the

results could be so severe as to damper progress of ESDP as a whole. The uncertainties left from broadly worded treaties have sparked bureaucratic fights. Initially complicated by the Maastricht Treaty, "CFSP extended all areas of foreign and security policy, but with due observance for Community areas of competence, compounds the confusion."<sup>24</sup> All of this confusion and internal strife will greatly influence the initial big transitions of security entities of the EU from solely economic. This then leads one to question the ease to which the EU can have a viable military component within its economically based framework. "The EC's impotence during the Gulf War prompted Belgium's foreign minister to complain that Europe was 'an economic giant, political dwarf and military worm' for several reasons: the member states could not agree or did not try to form a joint response, military efforts among the Twelve were limited, and member states followed their own independent policies."<sup>25</sup> This is just one of the many challenges facing ESDP. This seems to suggest that military and defense capability integration will be much more difficult than the economic integrations completed by the members of the EU.

#### ESDP AND NATO

It is convincingly argued that NATO plays the biggest role in the future of ESDP. This defense organization, led by the United States and stationed in the EU's capital of Brussels, has immense influence over the future of ESDP. In order to synthesize all of the data, opinions and theories, this section will be divided into the following sub sections: the current relationship between NATO and ESDP, the United States' feelings towards NATO and ESDP, analyzing the possibility of ESDP replacing NATO, and finally some possible futures of ESDP and NATO.

The current relationship between NATO and ESDP is really a function of the current relationship between the United States and Europe. "At the political level, the key question is whether the EU and NATO (meaning, essentially, the US) can agree on whether the basic strategic interests of the US and the EU are identical, merely compatible, or actually divergent."<sup>26</sup> In simplest terms, the United States wishes to keep NATO as the superior overarching hand over Europe's ESDP. "The USA is concerned with maintaining NATO's salience as the

main security organization in Europe."<sup>27</sup> Because of this, "American policy has sought to ensure that the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) remains subordinate to NATO. It has done so not only by seeking political guarantees, but also by insisting that Europe should not duplicate NATO command and control assets."<sup>28</sup> For Europe, it sees itself as competing against actors such as NATO for independence and control. At the international level "the EU is not competing against its own member states, but posits itself as an actor among other actors such as NATO. Member states have control over ESDP, not only over the decision process but also the type, location and duration of missions."<sup>29</sup> What do these contrasting notions imply about the US/EU relationship?

There are numerous paradoxes to the American European relationship of NATO and ESDP. One is that "ESDP represents a serious effort to fulfill two long standing American policy goals- greater European integration and coordination in defense policy and more balanced burden sharing by the allies."<sup>30</sup> Washington has not been too keen on this interpretation. Another is "that while some of its proponents see ESDP as essential in order to right a serious imbalance in NATO, others reject the idea that NATO needs to be fixed and believe that ESDP could prove disastrous for the alliance."<sup>31</sup> NATO "also touched upon fundamental issues such as the identity of the community being defended, an Atlantic community or separate American and European communities and the divisibility of the burdens being shared."<sup>32</sup>

The nature of this relationship makes it necessary to examine how the United States feels towards NATO and ESDP. Particular focus is placed on the post Cold War time period because NATO's role and function has changed with the no longer imminent Soviet threat and has thus changed how many view NATO, its role and capabilities. This defacto means a potential new role for the United States. Initially "Europe's first stepped toward a common security capability in the early 1990s, while America was hesitant to wholly accept such a shift."<sup>33</sup> However, "fifteen years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO's strategic doctrine has undergone a radical adjustment, and is now taking on an increasingly global perspective."<sup>34</sup> Nevertheless, American policy makers have a somewhat jaded view towards European policy makers. Therefore, "the conclusion from this

analysis is that, weak or powerful, Europe cannot be trusted, and any European force must be controlled by America.”<sup>35</sup>

The current Bush administration’s policies towards ESDP are consistent with these feelings, yet not as openly hostile as Clinton’s. The Bush administration sees “the EU ... as a threat to its policy hegemony in NATO.”<sup>36</sup> This in turn has resulted in Bush endorsing “a very limited view of ESDP- a back-up peacekeeping force for cases where the United States does not want NATO involved.”<sup>37</sup> This is a contrast of the approach from when “Clinton administration officials were involved in actively trying to shape the development of the ESDP and building links to NATO. Under Bush, Europe enjoyed a much lower priority, and hence the ESDP dropped in significance; US policy became much more reactive, and attempts to mold the ESDP’s development have diminished.”<sup>38</sup>

Now that there is an understanding of the attitudes on both sides, it is imperative to examine the actual capacity for ESDP replacing NATO, which all evidence points to a resounding “no.” A strong mantra includes ideas such as :“NATO will survive. The EU needs NATO because, for the foreseeable future, it will remain militarily impotent without it. The US needs NATO to legitimize its ongoing presence and influence in Europe. However, the form in which the Alliance will survive remains very unclear.”<sup>39</sup>

Significant military resources belonging to NATO are needed for European defense. As of yet, Europe does not have the capabilities nor assets to obtain such needed elements for themselves separate from NATO. “US airbases and multinational corporations are still located in Europe. The United States still broadly supports the development of a more regulated common foreign policy for the EU, albeit within limits and in the context of NATO. Furthermore, Europe is much more effective as a strong partner alongside Washington in its fight against global terrorism than as an also-ran lackey.”<sup>40</sup> This is not to say that Europe does not have some wherewithal to handle European security matters. Nevertheless, even though it is important for Western European military flexibility, “a Western European alliance would be an ineffective substitute for NATO.”<sup>41</sup>

The subtler elements of identity also greatly influence whether or not ESDP can surpass NATO. “The rhetoric of the opening of the Maastricht negotiations—the European Union’s ‘rendezvous with history’—shows that the goal of the security policy of the European Union is not for defense or deterrence, but rather for swaggering in order to define the identity of the European Union and to nation build.”<sup>42</sup> “To compete with the United States, the Europeans had no choice but to integrate both economically and politically. To get the Europeans out from under America’s thumb, they pursued the formation of a uniquely European security identity, clearly separate and distinct from that of the United States.”<sup>43</sup> In the past, US-EU relations followed a common pattern: “European disapproval of US policy leads to an increased desire among the member states for a separate security identity. However, the result is more rhetoric than reality because the member states lack consensus on how to proceed.”<sup>44</sup> Many times “the way to define Europe was ‘not American.’ Rejection of American ways was to embrace European ways. As a result, the member states created European Political Cooperation (EPC) as an intergovernmental forum within which they could discuss foreign policy issues.”<sup>45</sup>

With the great extent of internal inconsistency and level of consensus, this necessitates exploring. Variations of joint cooperation seem to be the best options for all involved. Other rising powers in the world such as China and possibly Russia might act as enticement for the US and Europe to use their abilities and resources more tightly together. Rising multipolarity in the world might entice the US and Europe to stay together. European and American separation is “quite unrealistic, however, from a political economic perspective. Indeed, just because the world is becoming more multipolar does not mean that the US and Europe will go their separate ways. To the contrary, the rise of other poles of power could well be a reason for the US and Europe to stay together.”<sup>46</sup> Another view involves a transformation of NATO where all parties make adjustments to recreate the transatlantic reliance. Ideally, “the US will develop softer instruments and the EU harder ones and there will be a new type of EU-US covenant or treaty to embrace NATO and broaden its remit.”<sup>47</sup>

Obviously NATO will have a large influence in the future development of ESDP. NATO as an

organization with a life of its own is only one of many reasons an independent ESDP is not likely to happen soon.

#### WHY AN INDEPENDENT ESDP IS UNLIKELY SOON

“EU rhetoric far exceeds the reality.”<sup>48</sup> This one sentence sums up why an independent viable ESDP is unlikely. Several facets that make up this bleak statement show the numerous hurdles ESDP must overcome.

Some scholars assert that regardless of any claims, the bottom line is that a Common Foreign Defense Policy, CFDP, which would encompass ESDP, is a long way off. Reasons for this are deep internal issues and lack of goals for such an undertaking. “Deep institutional divisions, competing definitions of ‘crisis management’ and fierce bureaucratic politics risk that the ESDP will remain at arm’s length from internal security concerns in the short term”<sup>49</sup>. Unfortunately, it seems that “the ambiguity and ill-defined goals of the ESDP produce competition today, but can also illuminate points of convergence and cooperation for the future.”<sup>50</sup>

Another reason is that Europe is unwilling to antagonize their biggest security partner. The various attitudes and circumstances with NATO have already been discussed, but these provide specifics on why the relationship between the EU and US will slow an independence process. Ultimately, “no fundamental difference of interest exists within the Atlantic community and that can be gained by fruitful partnerships than by mutual antagonism.”<sup>51</sup> Further, “It should also become clear that crude zero-sum calculations of relative loss and gain have no place in a multilateral alliance or wider partnership. As NATO Secretary General Robertson has argued, ‘More Europe does not mean less United States, it means a stronger NATO.’”<sup>52</sup>

Anderson argues, however, that the United States and Europe have parted ways on how they view security. He paints a precarious picture of the relationship, insinuating that this element might soon change. “When it comes to setting national priorities, determining threats, defining challenges, and fashioning and implementing foreign and defense policies, the United States and Europe

have parted ways.”<sup>53</sup> He does realize, though, that even though the nature of the relationship has changed, certain fundamental elements have yet to do so, therefore the EU and US will be joined together in defense and security relationships for the future. “Why would the European allies seek to create a competing military force outside NATO when worried about American isolationism and when unable and unwilling to dedicate the necessary resources?”<sup>54</sup>

It is not only outside forces that will prevent the rise of ESDP. Europeans themselves are responsible for the stagnancy. “The political will is simply not there.”<sup>55</sup> What will create the political will if anything? Are the troubles for consensus on defense and security measures a sign of holes in the grand scheme of the EU, as economics are far different from defense and security measures? Fourteen years of negotiations and “the member states have yet to decide on whether to have a common defense or on how to vote to make foreign and security policy decisions. The political will simply is not there.”<sup>56</sup> There does not seem to be any evidence to suggest this will change. In sum, “since 1992, the lack of political will and money has stymied the development of the ESDP. In the future, there is no sign this trend will change.”<sup>57</sup>

The lack of political will is evidenced in the lack of money being directed to ESDP. “Much of EU funding is now directed toward the ten new eastern member states, especially in the form of Common Agricultural Policy subsidies” and “these new member states, especially Poland and the Baltic’s, are much more favorable toward the United States and NATO than to an ESDP”<sup>58</sup>. There is no evidence that increasing defense money towards ESDP or any “widespread commitment to make any significant increase in the contribution of any major Member State of the EU.”<sup>59</sup>

Issues from a different vein also pose significant problems towards a stronger ESDP and that is the mere make-up of the population of the EU countries. Surprisingly, “most European armies are shrinking as states abandon university conscription—that is a cheap form of military labor—for more expensive volunteer forces. As a result, “the general degree of militarization in Western European populations has thus sunk and is still sinking.”<sup>60</sup> This, combined with the rapidly aging European population, will



make it difficult to sustain a viable ESDP even if it worked through all of the other problems.

### SUGGESTIONS FOR ESDP

ESDP is going to be a factor in European politics for a long time to come. There are some avenues policy makers could focus upon to make the likelihood of an independent ESDP more viable. The first is a cohesive European policy in regards to security and defense. While this issue in and of itself requires immense time, resources and work, it is necessary for a cohesive strategy to be in place for it to transfer to the maintaining and execution of a separate viable military. Control of a military requires direction from a single source in charge. But who will serve as this one voice? This must be decided.

This is the second suggestion for Europe. In order to have effective control over a military apparatus, the members of the EU need to fashion as close to a singular identity as possible or at least to the extent to where they can act and function with a singular identity. With the EU still expanding, especially into Eastern Europe, this proposition will be difficult to achieve. However, if the members recognize the need to develop enough for a European identity for defense and security measures, ESDP would have a more focused future.

Finally, the transfer of ESDP to a functioning military will require immense monetary resources, which up to this point the member countries have not been willing to contribute. Europeans must decide whether or not they are ready to bear the responsibility of a viable defense apparatus, which will entail finding a way to give it the resources it needs. With the right amount of money, an independent ESDP will have a much more viable future. This seems the most plausible and probable avenue for Europeans to follow.

### CONCLUSIONS

The question of the likelihood of ESDP turning into an independent viable military is pertinent because this question gives insight into the rapidly changing nature of Europe and the EU. It also has implications for transatlantic relations with the United States and NATO.

Since its inception, there have been the dualist views of an eventual ESDP as seen in British and French rhetoric. Add to this the continued expansion to now twenty seven member states of the EU. Statistical evidence shows that many Europeans are in favor of a more independent ESDP, free of American influence, but also recognize the need for NATO security.

ESDP as a crisis management institution has become a tool for internal as well as external crisis management. The pros for this mainly focus on cooperation for terrorist information sharing and prevention. This is usurped by the bigger problem of institutional competition. This perhaps shows that security and defense integration will be more difficult than economic integration.

The relationship between ESDP and NATO is changing, but not necessarily separating. Differing views of the ESDP NATO relationship in the context of the transatlantic alliance are examined, ultimately showing the ESDP needs NATO because it does not have the capabilities to effectively protect and defend Europe. These issues combined with the unlikely nature of CFDP, lack of political will, aging population, lower military personnel numbers, and lack of adequate defense budget funding all factor into the bleak outlook for an independent ESDP.

To hasten the process for an independent ESDP Europe must focus on creating a cohesive European policy. In order for this to be accomplished, a singular European identity must be forged. To this adequate funding must be applied.

While the likelihood of ESDP singularly handling European defensive and military affairs seems highly unlikely, many of the building blocks are in place. Europe has numerous significant issues it must address before this can become a viable option for the EU.

APPENDIX 1

Below is one of the questions from Eichenberg's survey of attitudes towards ESDP and NATO.

- 10a. *Eurobarometer* (11/89): Some people say that NATO is still essential to our country's security. Others say NATO is no longer essential to our country's security. Which view is closer to your own?
- 10b. *Eurobarometer*: In your opinion, should NATO continue to be the most important forum for making decisions about the security of Western Europe in the future, or should the EU make those decisions, or should some other organization?

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	<u>NATO Essential</u>		<u>NATO versus the EU</u>		<u>N</u>
	<u>NATO Essential %</u>	<u>Not Essential %</u>	<u>NATO Decides %</u>	<u>EU Decides %</u>	
France	41	28	21	46	1,000
Germany	59	24	45	31	1,136
Italy	46	28	19	60	1,032
Great Britain	67	17	42	31	947

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# THE NEXT 100 YEARS: ENERGY SECURITY IN A COMPLEX WORLD

*“Economic integration spreads wealth across the globe, but also makes local economies more subject to global market conditions.”*

– United States National Security Strategy 2006

## INTRODUCTION

“Exponential” is the word that comes to mind when attempting to contextualize human progress for the last 150 years. For the United States of America, this exponential growth in progress has been especially pronounced. Today, the United States of America enjoys the largest economy on earth (Economist, 2007), utilizes 28% of the world’s energy (EIA, 2007), has the most efficient economy (EIA, 2007), enjoys a high human development index rating (HDI, 2006), our people live in a free market system, and our people enjoy living in the world’s first engineered liberal democracy (Kissinger, 1994). According to the KOF index, a measure of globalization, the world today is more globalized than ever before (Figure 1). Given this degree of globalization, regional economic impacts generally carry global consequences (NSS, 2006).

Today, the world consumes over 420 quadrillion BTU of energy with 86% of it derived from the fossil fuels (EIA, 2007). By the year 2030, the world is projected to consume over 620 quadrillion BTU and 84% of that energy is projected to be from fossil fuels: an overall increase in energy consumption greater than 30% (EIA, 2007). The 20th Century was the first century when the world was powered primarily by fossil fuels (Yergin, 1991). The 21st century will be the second century powered by fossil fuels. Given the tightly coupled nature of the world’s economies, any attempt to look at energy security for the United States of America must be done in the context of worldwide energy security and stability. This paper will focus on energy security as a component of United States National Security Strategy.

It is organized as follows:

- ◆ The Centrality of Fossil Fuels
- ◆ The Economics of Energy
- ◆ Geopolitical Considerations
- ◆ Ecology and Its Discontents
- ◆ Pathfinders for a Post-Hydrocarbon World
- ◆ Discussion - The Role of Government
- ◆ Conclusion

## THE CENTRALITY OF THE FOSSIL FUELS

*“Though the modern history of oil begins in the latter half of the nineteenth century, it is the twentieth century that has been completely transformed by the advent of petroleum.”*

–Michael Yergin, 1991

Three factors affect whether a particular energy source will be used by the societies of the world: density, abundance, and ease of utilization. From an energy density standpoint, fossil fuels (hydrocarbons) offer to humanity one of the most compact sources of energy available. When the energy density of oil, gas, and coal are compared

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Figure 1

Source: KOF Index of Globalization 2007

against the energy density of other sources of energy such as wood, household waste, and ethanol we find that fossil hydrocarbons readily displace these alternative energy sources in terms of energy compactness. On the other hand, the energy stored in the chemical bonds of fossil fuels is extremely weak when compared against the energy stored in the proton and neutron bonds of the atomic nucleus that can be released through the nuclear processes of fission and fusion.

On abundance, in his seminal work, *Nuclear Energy and the Fossil Fuels*, Dr. M. King Hubbert while serving as chief geologist for the Shell Development Company analyzed fossil fuel abundance on the earth's crust with emphasis on oil production and depletion rates for oil, coal, and nuclear fuels. His analysis correctly predicted that the United States oil production would reach a peak in production by 1970 and projected that world oil production would peak near the year 2000 (Hubbert, 1956). He estimated that coal production would peak in the United States after the year 2200 with eventual exhaustion by the year 2700 (1956). He also estimated that our reserves of uranium could sustain humanity thousands of years into the future (1956). Dr. Hubbert's analysis regarding oil precipitated a forty-year crescendo of discourse by scientists worldwide regarding an impending oil peak. In February 2007, The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a comprehensive study warning that global oil production could peak without warning within the next forty years and that the United States is unprepared for such an eventuality. Contextually

though and by most analysis (Hubbert included), the fossil fuels are abundant in the earth's crusts. Today's estimates, refinements of Hubbert's work, project that the world has approximately 100 years in liquid oil reserves (Economist, 2006). We project that we have slightly less than 100 years in natural gas reserves, that we have 300 years in coal reserves, and that we have vast reserves of untapped oil in oil-shale and tar-sands which under the correct economic conditions can be harnessed to fuel the world for the next 300 years. Also, North America contains the world's largest reserves of coal, tar-sand oil, and oil-shale oil (Bartis, Latourette and Dixon, 2005).

Ease of extraction is the third component of making energy resources viable. When looking at energy density and abundance we can surmise that nuclear fuels (fusion and fission) are the most attractive sources of energy for humanity. However attractive the promise of energy stored within the nuclear forces of the atom, the benefits of such technologically advanced energy sources come at very high prices. Fusion holds the most promise for humanity but we have been unable to achieve a self-sustaining fusion to date for more than a few seconds at a time even after fifty years of research. Our best estimates place commercial nuclear fusion technology fifty to one-hundred years in the future (ITER, 2007). Humanity has had better success with nuclear fission but the exploitation of this energy source has come at a significant cost. First, nuclear fuel can be weaponized into nuclear bombs. Second, storage of nuclear fission waste that remains lethally radioactive for tens of thousands of years poses significant challenges for the entire planet. Finally, although the safety record of the world's nuclear programs remains excellent, nuclear fission reactors carry risks of nuclear reactor accidents that can threaten large geographic regions with dangerous radiation poisoning. Today, advances in reactor technologies promise to increase the margin of safety while at the same time both minimizing the amount of nuclear waste and the weapons grade material produced.

At the other end of the spectrum with renewables, the energy density in renewables, the technologies required to commercialize the technologies, and the lack of sufficient availability of renewable energy sources presents significant challenges to widespread adoption although work continues aggressively

today. Finally, on renewables, hydroelectric energy already provides a significant percentage of all renewable energy (approximately 4% of United States Energy production) but it is geographically limited to areas where there is enough relief for hydroelectric power to be generated.

The Energy compactness, ease of extraction, and availability of fossil fuels have allowed them to rise and establish themselves as the most utilized form of energy by humanity. Figure 2 denotes a more comprehensive breakdown of energy consumption by economic region and fuel type through 2030. Today 361 quadrillion out of the 421 quadrillion BTU of the world's energy comes from the fossil fuels (EIA, 2007). By 2030, 524 quadrillion out of the projected 620 quadrillion BTU of our energy is projected to come from the fossil fuels (EIA, 2007). In the starkest of terms, there is no renewable source of energy available to humanity (or in a viable planning phase) at this time that can replace 524 quadrillion BTUs of energy consumption in the next 30 to 50 years in a sustainable fashion. The world will remain a hydrocarbon world for the near future.

THE ECONOMICS OF ENERGY

*“Since the more than tenfold increase in crude oil prices between 1972 and 1981, world oil consumption per real dollar equivalent of global gross domestic product (GDP) has declined by approximately one-third.”*

*—Alan Greenspan, 2005*

From the previous section, we determined that fossil fuels were widely available throughout the earth in sufficient quantities to fuel the earth's economies for two to three hundred years. From an economics standpoint, fossil fuels are governed by the same forces of supply and demand that affect other aspects of our economy. When discussing energy security, one of the traditional threats mentioned is that of “high energy prices.” However, there are two challenges in discussing energy security economically using the subjective terms “high” and the similarly relative term, “price.” Both the terms reflect subjective conditions that are difficult to quantify. It is more useful to look at energy security from the overall supply of broad baskets of energy resources, the overall demand for such resources, the marginal rate of substitution between those

energy resources, the stability of the resource, and the utility (efficiency) of our economy in making use of these energy resources.




Figure 2

Source: International Energy Outlook, May 2007. Energy Information Administration, Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecast.

We know that we have fossil fuels for 300 years and we know that we have the technology to extract energy from these fossil fuels albeit at different costs. We also understand the marginal rate of substitution for these resources. Economic viability of different types of oil, coal, and natural gas are different. Substitution of one energy form into another is possible at different costs. As demand increases and supply decreases, prices will increase, and different forms of energy that were not viably substituted at lower demands become viable substitutions at the higher demands for the fuels (Figure 3). As an example, in current economic conditions as the price of oil goes above \$15 a barrel, it becomes viable to produce oil in Texas and as the prices continue to rise, it becomes viable to produce oil using expensive and complex deep sea drilling technologies in the Gulf of Mexico, North Seas, or off the coast of Nigeria. As the price of oil continues to climb, coal liquefaction, tar-sand extraction, etc., becomes viable at approximately \$40 per barrel. If the demand becomes great enough, oil-shale extraction of oil becomes economically viable and this type of energy albeit expensive to process is extremely plentiful. Therefore when dealing with supply and demand of energy resources, it is important to keep in mind, marginal cost of substitution at which new sources of energy can substitute for traditional sources of energy.

Fuel Type	Economic Viability (2007 Cost)	Reserves (at current consumption)
Biodiesel	\$ 80.00	renewable
Oil Shale oil	\$ 50.00	300 years
Coal Liquefaction	\$ 40.00	300 years
Brazil Ethanol	\$ 40.00	renewable
Tar-Sand oil	\$ 40.00	300 years
Deep Sea Oil	\$ 35.00	50 years
Texas Oil	\$ 12.00	50 years
Arabian Oil	\$ 1.50	100 years

Figure 3

Source: *The Economist* 2006, *JEC* 2005, and *EIA* 2007

The second component that should be considered with respect to energy security and economics is the measure of how efficiently a society utilizes energy. The United States of America is the most efficient economy on Earth (EIA, 2007). That is because the United States moved away from hard industries to the post-industrial economies of services and information economy (both significantly more energy-efficient than industrial economies). Alan Greenspan quantified the reason for this shift:

*“Much of the decline in the ratio of oil use to real GDP in the United States has resulted from growth in the proportion of GDP composed of services, high-tech goods, and other presumably less oil-intensive industries.”*

– Alan Greenspan, 2005

GDP is the standard measure of economic health and productivity for the world. The more efficient our economy is at utilizing energy, the more value we create from that energy and the less amount of energy we require to generate value and compete effectively in the world economies. Therefore, it is desirable that from an energy security standpoint, we advocate a highly efficient economy with respect to energy and high efficiency does not equate with low price. Low energy prices promote waste. High efficiency indicates to “right priced energy.”

The final consideration from an economic standpoint that will be addressed in this paper is that of stability of energy flows. Alan Greenspan

said that the history of the world petroleum industry was one of a rapidly growing industries seeking the stable prices that have been seen by producers as essential to the expansion of the market (2005). Where scarcity drives prices higher, scarcity in one energy resource can be substituted with another if enough time is present for the markets to adjust. Instability (both in wide fluctuation in price as well as supply) though, manifests itself as much more destructive to an economy. Stable expansion of the oil supply at a similar pace as the world’s economic growth is critical. From an economic standpoint, it is much more desirable to have high-energy prices on uninterrupted manner than to have widely fluctuating prices or supply interruptions.

### GEOPOLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

*“Oil prices had been persistently edging higher since 2002 as increases in global oil consumption progressively absorbed the buffer of several million barrels a day in excess capacity that stood between production and demand.”*

– Alan Greenspan, 2005

As the world’s economies expand, they will require more energy – especially if they’re industrializing. For decades, the world’s largest oil producers had maintained a surplus capacity in oil production capability that was used to moderate supply and demand while also maintaining high oil prices. This spare oil production capacity could be used in different manners. If a particular crisis developed in part of the world that interrupted production from that region, spare production could be brought on line to keep prices from fluctuating. However, this reserve spare capacity has been decreasing in recent years. In large part, this is due to the expansion of the world economies including China and India. If the world’s suppliers of oil are forced to produce oil at their maximum rate due to the continued expansion rate of the world’s economies, then the world will be locked into a perpetual supply constrained scenario for oil and prices will increase. The only release valve would be either economic slowdowns or substitutions for other forms of energy. If the world’s economies industrialize and expand at a measured rate, then the prices should remain high enough for substitutes for oil to become available and for markets to develop in the form of tar-sand oil, oil-shale oil etc. However, if the



world's economies expand too quickly before the stable substitutions can be brought on-line, supply shortages in oil could cause instability in the world economies, driving recessions and depressions and forcing unconventional oil producers into potential bankruptcy. Managing stable world fossil fuel expansion is a key to providing energy security for the United States.

Yergin wrote that the peoples of the developing world showed no indication that they would deny themselves the benefits of oil powered economies (Yergin, 1992). If Yergin was correct in his analysis, the world's economies will continue to industrialize at an accelerating pace. The populations of China and India are large enough to precipitate an increase in oil demand to where we will move into a supply-constrained scenario for oil if not for all the fossil fuels in the coming decades (barring global economic slowdowns). The United States of America must prepare for this eventuality.

#### ECOLOGY AND ITS DISCONTENTS

*“Hydrocarbon Man shows little inclination to give up his cars, his suburban home, and what he takes to be not only the conveniences but the essentials of his way of life. The peoples of the developing world give no indication that they want to deny themselves the benefits of an oil-powered economy, whatever the environmental questions.”*

*- Michael Yergin, 1991*

Two factors will determine the length of the world's hydrocarbon age: 1) supply vs. demand of hydrocarbons and 2) the ecological impacts of using those hydrocarbons. We've analyzed in previous sections that there are sufficient fossil fuels (hydrocarbons) available to humanity to fuel the world's economies for the next several hundred years and that demand appears to expand as the world's economies expand. We do not have as clear an understanding on the impact that burning those fossil fuels has on the ecology of the planet, whether we've already caused damage, the extent of such damage, or what is the impact of burning the remainder of our available reserves of fossil fuels.

In his book, *The Prize*, Michael Yergin describes a great clash between the benefits from on the one hand the economic growth fueled by hydrocarbons

and on the other hand ecological protection (1991). We can surmise that China and India with their 2+ billion people continue to experience economic growth between 5 and 9 % that their impacts to global fossil fuel emissions will continue to increase. Since China adds the equivalent of one United Kingdom's worth of electricity in dirty coal plants every year (Economist, 2006), we have to rationalize that growth with ecological protective measures in the United States alone. The United States should exercise prudence and begin earnest dialogs on reasonable measures to protect the world's ecology while at the same time not take stringent ecological measures which would adversely affect the economy of the United States and hamper our global competitiveness.

The current tenor of the ecologic movement (as well as the energy independence movement) is that the United States should invest in ethanol and other renewable technologies in an attempt to reduce our dependence on foreign sources of oil. Care should be taken that the analysis performed is not too superficial by well-intentioned legislators. Energy independence is arbitrary if all of our trading partners are fully dependent on fossil fuels and if we rely on trade with them for our well-being. Energy from renewable sources does not show the promise to materially impact the bulk of the world's energy production (EIA, 2007). Therefore, increasing taxes on energy companies to subsidize well-intentioned but immaterial or unproven renewable ventures could adversely affect the economic viability of the energy companies on which we rely critically for our vital energy supplies. The ecologic movement (and energy independence movement) while well intentioned, require much maturation before they should affect material legislation.

#### PATHFINDERS FOR A POST-HYDROCARBON WORLD

*“We have worked with industrialized and emerging nations on hydrogen, clean coal, and advanced nuclear technologies...”*

*- United States National Security Strategy 2006*

M. King Hubbert's projections and predictions have been proven correct in many circumstances and the GAO agrees that the world is nearing an oil peak (GAO 2007). At the same time, we know that the world has approximately 200 to 300 years

of viable fossil fuel reserves. However, we also know that the world's emerging economies are growing at phenomenal rates. We also have some indicators that the hydrocarbon age is causing damage to the ecology of the planet. There is no definite date on when the Hydrocarbon Age will end but given all of the factors presented above, it will end within the next couple of centuries. Therefore, energy security has to encompass the quantification of this occurrence and the long-term planning for a transition to a post-hydrocarbon economy, beginning with a planning phase.

Today, there are no viable energy sources on the planet aside from nuclear power which can in their entirety replace today's 420 quadrillion BTU of energy and tomorrow's projected 620 quadrillion BTU of energy. Renewables at best are projected to displace 8-10% of our energy consumption by 2030 (EIA, 2007). On this second hydrocarbon century, it is time to begin to identify pathfinders for the future. Pathfinders must explore alternatives that have the capability to replace the bulk of the energy that is currently generated by the fossil fuels and not minor percentages. All available indicators show that the most likely alternatives will be some form of advanced solar technology in tandem with perfecting the nuclear technologies of fission or fusion all combined with hydrogen technologies for transportation. All of these options present enormous scientific, engineering, and technical challenges to the United States of America and to the world and successful pathfinders could take decades or centuries to perfect and commercialize.

The United States participates in the world with respect to hydrogen, fusion, fission, and clean coal research (NSS, 2006). The United States though should seriously consider establishing strongly integrated joint ventures with the post-industrial economies of the world to identify the true future pathfinders that will provide clean, economically viable sources of energy for the centuries to come. Such programs should be milestone driven. At the same time, the United States government is contemplating additional taxes to energy companies to fund multiple pathfinder technologies like ethanol. Milton Friedman wrote that governments were poor substitutes for markets (1980), care should be exercised that the foundations of our energy industries are not undercut by well meaning legislators working under the idealistic umbrellas of energy independence and ecology to divert funds

dubious pathfinder projects. As oil becomes more scarce, oil companies will need to drill numerous new wells to make up for production declines. They will have to invest in new technologies like tar-sand extraction, water injection, deep sea drilling, and oil-shale extraction to continue to provide energy to the world in a proven fashion. Energy companies are over-taxed not under-taxed in our current environment.

#### DISCUSSION – THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

*“There has been an energy crisis because government created one...there is one simple way to end the energy crisis and gasoline shortage tomorrow... Eliminate all controls on the prices of crude oil and all other petroleum products... the monopolistic behavior of the OPEC cartel might keep petroleum products expensive, but they would not produce the disorganization, chaos, and confusion that we now confront.”*

– Milton Friedman, 1980

The role of government in listening to the people of the United States must be a careful one that fully distills the complex yet direct requirements that the people have of our government. From the previous sections, the United States government should work to: 1) provide energy stability and prevent energy disruptions, 2) promote stable free markets and economic expansion, 3) provide shelters in case of global economic slowdowns, and 4) plant seeds for the long future. Also from the previous sections, the United States government should not be distracted by well-intentioned yet incorrect reactions to energy security such as: 1) preventing high prices, 2) securing energy independence, 3) taxing energy companies to provide funding for immaterial renewable technologies and 4) being overly mindful of ecologic matters when the rest of the world is not mindful.

The United States should continue to take measures as needed to prevent disruptions in oil and fossil fuels to the markets of the world and should perform this function in conjunction with the world's industrialized powers. Disruption (along with wild fluctuation) is singularly one of the greatest threats to the economies of the world and not high prices. The United States should focus on the global expansion rates of the world's

economies and should pay close attention to economic cycles of the world's economies. Also, if it appears that oil prices are forcing global economic shocks, the United States should work to accelerate substitution technologies within the United States and abroad to ensure stable energy prices as the world's economies expand. In case of economic slowdowns, the United States should provide umbrellas to energy industries that can only operate at certain economic costs. Finally, the United States should work with the industrial countries of the world on the pathfinders for the future like solar, hydrogen, advanced fission, fusion, clean coal and work to develop milestone-based transition strategies that can be implemented in a free market fashion to transition the world to a post-hydrocarbon economy in the next two centuries.

The ecological movement and energy independence movements have strong lobbies on our government and recent global events have caused their perspectives to be reinforced. There is material risk that the analysis being performed by well-intentioned ecological and energy independence movements to be faulty given the realities of globalization and the percentage of energy derived from the fossil fuels. The United States government needs to charter comprehensive analysis (not for or against fossil fuels) but rather comprehensive analysis that factors all aspects of energy security before undertaking energy independence, low price seeking or simplistic taxation and incentive schemes.

## CONCLUSION

*“Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the government’s purposes are beneficial. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greater dangers to liberty lurk in the insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”*

– Justice Louis Brandeis  
*Olmstead v. United States*  
277 US 479 (1928)

The 21st century will also be a century of oil and fossil fuels. Instead of it being a period of exponential growth in fossil fuel use though, many of the exponential growth we experienced

in the last 100 years will show the arresting forces of the logistics function: tapering to a new static level. From our current vantage, we can say that we are in the middle-ages of the hydrocarbon age. Already, we can see the end of the hydrocarbon age. Conventional oil production is about to peak, and unconventional oil will have to replace the shortfalls. Ecologically, there is evidence that the utilization of hydrocarbons has a negative impact on our climate and biosphere. We are engaged in wars safeguarding the access of oil resources. Now is not the time to panic and undertake wasteful mass scale subsidization of unproven renewables approaches. Now is the time to purposefully plan and execute a comprehensive energy strategy for the future. Free market economies have worked well for us, and we should leverage that efficiency in our capital markets. At the same time, there are a few areas where markets cannot solve our problems like in the extreme future thinking and seed research needed for truly transformational pathfinder energy technologies. There is much risk that well-intentioned but not-well-thought-out legislative schemes can fundamentally hurt the world's energy producers with over-taxation. Today, we have the time, energy resources, educational systems, peace, and global integration required to both provide for our current energy security while planning and executing a purposeful and intelligent transition to a post-hydrocarbon world (within two centuries). Only through the intelligent application of academically acquired knowledge and prudent application of resources can the United States government provide the energy security that is so vital to the National Security Strategy of the United States of America.

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# TRANSFORMING TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY-WITH ADJECTIVES

*Abstract*

*Security is a flexible concept in NATO-EU relations. 1975 Helsinki process accepts a wide definition of security to reflect complex interdependence. Traditionally collective security coexists with collective defense. Although security and defense are complementary in the transatlantic system, their differentiation clarifies the concepts. While the concept defense is a stable characteristic of the functioning of the system, the concept security is flexible and some of its versions (human, or comprehensive) broaden its contents, other versions (national-now homeland) remain constant, and still others (common) deepen its contents. Thus adjectives as “human”, “comprehensive” and “homeland” enter the transatlantic security debate at different stages. However, these “securities with adjectives” are not universally applicable-thus unreliable explanatory bases for the future NATO-EU relations. The paper applies security concepts to EU security to find elements of common, comprehensive and human security within the EU. NATO remains a common security provider. Thus EU widens and NATO deepens the security concept. NATO-EU security however is still a matter of ad-hoc decisions, unfixed combination of adjectives.*

## **DEEPENING AND WIDENING OF THE SECURITY CONCEPT**

Adding different adjectives to security concept makes it liable to different theoretical interpretations.<sup>1</sup> The conventional definition of security stems from Realism in the form of national security. Nation and state coincide. It appears in the Westphalian order of states (Moller, 2000). Cooperative, comprehensive and human security appear as the main challengers (Bajpai, 2000).

In 1982 the Palme Commission delivers a report to the UN, where it introduces the concept cooperative (mutual or common) security. The idea opposes disarmament and mutual restraint to anarchy, solving Cold War security dilemma through joint actions. Thus cooperative security deepens the security concept in the military area. On the other hand both comprehensive and human security widen the concept as they include dimensions beyond the military one.

Initially human security as a post-Cold War 1994 UNDP creation, originates as an explanation of insecurities in the third world. Security becomes a synonym of development. Concept operationalization lacks precision and is

found in three versions: military (less casualties), economic (sustainable development), and legal (defending human rights) (Acharya, 2002). The increase of the number of internal conflicts in the developing countries at the beginning of the 90's leads to alternative security outlooks. International terrorism is among the threats to human security. National sovereignty and security of the people are treated with equal importance (Jolly, Ray, 2006). Military force is a last resort for the provision of human security (Axworthy, 1999:359). Building human security is a process that should involve diverse actors, short-term humanitarian actions and long-term strategies for peace and sustainable development (Axworthy, 1999: 360).

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Comprehensive security as a most recent concept has tried to explain the unity of different security dimensions-military, economic, political, environmental, cultural (Moller, 2000). However, the threat of excessive securitization of all spheres remains.

After 9/11 security has been trans-formed from human to homeland. Homeland security resembles the classical national security. Homeland security is an American prototype. Presidential order of 08.10.2001 creates a Homeland Security Office. It aims at achieving coordination in implementing American Security Strategy against terrorism. This strategy is a comprehensive long-term national plan supported by the federal budget for enhancing key areas as counter-reaction in case of bio-terrorism, border and airport security.

APPLYING SECURITY CONCEPTS TO EU AND NATO SECURITY

*EU Security*

On the one hand, the prevention of any future threat of war is the stimulus for collective European action at the very beginning of European integration. This approach to European security builds on common security. According to the above-mentioned security definitions, ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community), which is the basis of the contemporary EU, focuses on the economic dimension of security, an “approach of common

security to the economic security” (Moller, 2000). The idea for a network of mutual dependence becomes an element of classical liberalism and neo-functionalism. Multi-lateralism starts with a bilateral agreement (in this case between France and Germany). Mutual dependencies, multi-lateralism, and the spillover effect broaden the integration idea and gradually include more and more areas of mutual dependence, providing a comprehensive security foundation. Thus common security transforms into a comprehensive security.

On the other hand, the opposite assumption is to be found. Common security is based on human security or economic development. The evidence in support of that argument is that the Schuman declaration and plan integrate security and economic development, an idea of human security concept as well.<sup>2</sup> Economic development becomes possible after giving away sovereignty in vital areas of military industry at that time (coal and steel). Economic development needs solidarity, economic unification, and accountability to UN bodies (The Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950). It plans the creation of a European federation. The Schuman Plan is based on four community principles, which build an institutional approach: 1) Supreme role of the institutions; 2) institutional independence and accountability; 3) institutional cooperation and a specific function to each institution; 4) equality between member states. J. Mannel’s speech on Schuman’s plan (J. Mannel, in Fontaine 2000: 17) argues that a fusion of peoples’ interests should be achieved, not just an effort to maintain a balance

*Different Types of Security*

Types of security	Threats to security	Object of security	Widening/Deepening
1. National	Threats to national sovereignty and territory	State	Classical concept
2. Homeland	Same as above	State	Tight concept after 9/11
3. Collective	Military threats	State and institutions above the state	Deepening
4. Cooperative	Security dilemma	State	Deepening
5. Human	Threats to human survival, dignity and development	Individual and state	Widening
6. Comprehensive	Different dimensions	Different	Widening

Source: Author’s interpretation of S. Smith, B. Moller, documents from the UN Website, the Website for Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, and the Website of the White House of President George W. Bush.

of these interests. In this way “a union between people” rather than a coalition between states has been formed.

An important moment in building EU security is the 1992 Maastricht treaty (Treaty of the European Union) creating Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as a second pillar of the EU. CFSP creates a political union with common foreign and defense policy. European political community, formally institutionalized with the Single European Act of 1987, is based on consultations between member-states. CFSP needs intergovernmental cooperation and consensus in decision-making and has instruments as common strategies, positions and joint actions. The EU Constitution of October 29, 2004 introduces a minister of external affairs and external affairs services. The instruments are limited to decisions and international agreements. European security resembles a combination of national and collective security (enhanced national element). Its reflection is the European Security Strategy (ESS). ESS determines five threats to European security: 1) Terrorism; 2) Dissemination of weapons of mass destruction (biggest threat); 3) Regional conflicts; 4) Bad governance; 5) Organized crimes. Threats are more diverse, less visible and predictable and resemble the above mentioned human security concept. Coping with these threats requires Europe to be: 1) more active (early intervention, crisis management, crisis prevention); 2) more capable; 3) more coherent (joining resources and capabilities of EU and non-EU countries). “Effective multi-lateralism” has been mentioned as a strategy for action in ESS. Effective multi-lateralism or legitimacy of action (Kaldor, Martin, Selchow 2007: 278) is considered a dimension of human security.

According to some authors EU is already practicing human security, although named as crisis management, civil-military coordination, and conflict prevention (Kaldor, Martin, Selchow 2007:273).

#### *NATO Security*

After the end of the Cold War NATO undergoes a transformation in cooperative security. NATO expands its tasks to include: 1) Cooperation with recent Cold War enemies; 2) Conflict management in previous out-of-NATO-area regions (Haglund 2004: 20). The first task opens the Alliance, and the second involves NATO military on the Balkans.

1999 NATO strategic concept supports primarily security enhancement, prosperity and democracy in the Euro-Atlantic region- i.e. a democratic peace idea. The 1999 Strategic Concept starts the development of Euro-Atlantic security structure, where NATO plays a central role. The broad approach to security adds political, economic and social factors to security issues in order to respond to new risks as ethnic conflicts, economic decay, terrorism, dissemination of weapons of mass destruction. Articles 5, 6 ( defense against threat of aggression or an attack against any NATO member) and article 7 ( conflict prevention and crisis management) of the Washington Treaty serve as the foundation. Internal reform includes a new command structure- Combined Joint Task Force, building of European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO. Deterrent role of American, British and French nuclear forces provide a supreme security guarantee.

2006 Riga Summit Declaration emphasizes solidarity and inseparability of ally security. NATO is considered a “main forum of security consultations” between North America and European allies. According to NATO General Secretary Jaap Hoop Scheffer (29.01.2007) there is no security without development and no development without security. Challenges need to be addressed by a comprehensive approach to security, coordinating military and civil means (European Union website -NATO and the EU: Time for a New Chapter). A global approach to security could correspond to global threats like terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and bad governance. The need for a comprehensive security has been demonstrated by Afghanistan’s reconstruction, development, and democracy-building. The 2006 Riga Summit (NATO Website -The Comprehensive Political Guidance: A Primer) uses a wide approach to security in terms of NATO instruments for crisis management and cooperation with non-NATO member-states.

#### *NATO-EU Strategic Partnership - What Kind of Security?*

In essence NATO-EU strategic partnership is based on flexible coalitions and a strategic dialogue. On the one hand, EU uses this partnership to develop ESDP but EU uses the term for its relations with the US, Japan, China, Canada, India and possibly Russia as well. On the other hand, US position is different because it emphasizes on the threat of overlap between NATO and EU in the area

of transatlantic security. It accounts for EU's incapability of organizing solely a massive military operation for European defense (The Atlantic Council of the US -F.Burwell 2006:4). The new "security architecture" (Burwell, Gompert, Lebl and others 2006: 27) stems from a coordination mechanism between the NATO Reaction Force (NRF) and EU Battle Groups (EUBG). NRF serves as a catalyst for transformation of the NATO and EU armed forces.

Strategic partnership was started in 2002. The common aim of collective security and stability leads to three decisions: 1) EU provides participation of non-EU/European NATO members within ESDP; 2) common capabilities –NATO supports ESDP and gives EU access to NATO military planning capabilities; 3) both EU and NATO build capabilities in open relations with each other. Javier Solana considers strategic partnership a response to similar need of peace and stability, a response to new threats as organized crime, migration, diseases, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction. These threats are in the spirit of human security concept. Solana suggests a blurring between internal and external security boundaries, between political and military issues, between crisis prevention and crisis management. Unlike the American concept of "homeland security", which starts within the people, he uses the concept "homeland defense", which starts outside. According to him, EU's early participation in conflict prevention is an illustration of "smart security"- i.e., capability to work with partners.

Despite the efforts from both sides, a common mechanism for decision-making is still lacking and the approach is case-by-case. Comprehensive security concept differs in meaning from NATO's "comprehensive approach to security" (2007 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer), which simply broadens the means for achieving a common security. Riga's definition for NATO as a forum supports the argument that NATO and EU have built a non-formal regime, based on consensus and ad-hoc agreements. It could be regarded as a common-antipathy-regime<sup>3</sup> (common threats as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction), a coordination rather than cooperation.

## CONCLUSION

NATO and EU security policies, as well as NATO-EU "strategic partnership" have been explained with the help of the security concept. The paper applies the analysis to primary sources as official documents. EU widens the security concept and ESS's "effective multi-lateralism" is a characteristic of human security. NATO deepens the security concept. There is agreement on the nature of threats and the need for multi-national operation. However "strategic partnership" is still a forum for discussion, informal regime for ad-hoc coordination, rather than an established decision-making mechanism.

Some further fields of analysis include: 1) theoretical linkage of security and defense concepts, 2) the nature of the project ESDI within NATO, which includes both clarifying ESDI (European Security and Defense Identity) and NATO identity. For example, on the one hand, EU's role could be clarified with the help of the human security concept. Thus EU could improve NATO-UN relations (or US-UN relations). On the other hand, NATO could be transformed into a new two-pillar partnership between the US and the EU.

## NOTES

1. According to S. Smith (2002) six theoretical schools explain the security concept. These are: 1) Copenhagen school of Barry Buzan – widening the concept to five sectors, adding political, economic, societal and environmental sectors to the traditional military. Thus at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century state security has been supplied with societal security. 2) Constructivists like Alexander Wendt relate security to security community and security culture of different states. 3) Critical school directed towards realism and related to ideas of community, identity, human emancipation (Smith, 2002). 4) Feminism, criticizing state discrimination in providing security. 5) Post-structuralism considering security as a means for legitimation of state formation and maintenance. 6) Human security.



2. The Schuman Plan: The Birth of Community Europe, p. 17-22; Annexes – Declaration of May 1950, p. 36-38; P. Fontaine, 2000 – A new idea for Europe – The Schuman Declaration.
3. Definition of E. Haas.

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Website of NATO-The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, Washington, 23 - 24 April 1999; The Comprehensive Political Guidance: A primer; Washington Summit Communiqué, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. on 24th April 1999; EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP-16.12.2002; Riga Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Riga on 29 November 2006; Comprehensive Political Guidance- Endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government on 29 November 2006.

# TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: FUTURE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP OR CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS?

After years of waiting, Turkey finally began formal negotiations for accession into the European Union in October of 2005. Since that time, however, the process has been anything but smooth: Turkish and EU negotiators often disagree on the most important issues to discuss, and recently they seem to have reached an impasse over a number of contentious problems.

Situated at the very convergence of two civilizations—quite literally where the East meets the West—Turkey has become more geopolitically relevant than ever before. It is an economic gateway between two continents, a buffer zone between regional conflicts, and a symbolic unification of Asian and European identities. Current challenges in the world have forced Europe and the West to reevaluate Turkey's role as strategic partner and potential member of the European Union.

From a Turkish perspective, the possibility of membership in the EU represents a step on the path to true *Kemalism*,<sup>1</sup> a means of attaining modern, developed statehood. Membership also means increased security in a dangerous neighborhood, particularly on its Northern, Eastern and Southern borders where armed conflict has been the norm for decades, if not centuries. Interestingly, participants in the debate over Turkey's possible EU accession disagree on the important issues involved and the most significant challenges Turkey faces, in part because Turkey, the European Union, and the United States do not define "Westernization" in exactly the same way.<sup>2</sup> For Turks, Westernization does not necessarily mean democracy and pluralism, while these are both integral for most EU member states. Furthermore, the definition discrepancies do not affect primarily military relationships, as Turkey has with the United States and NATO, but they are very important in political and economic relationships, as the EU has become.<sup>3</sup>

Given all these considerations, Turkey has a number of important obstacles it will have to overcome on the road to European Union

accession. Economic, institutional, and security obstacles are significant, but the most daunting challenges Turkey faces are primarily political in nature. These challenges will require a long and drawn out negotiation process, and even at the end of the process, full Turkish membership in the European Union is an unlikely outcome.

## CHALLENGES TURKEY FACES IN THE ACCESSION PROCESS

Turkey faces three main types of challenges as it moves toward European Union membership: those that are primarily political, those that are primarily economic, and those that are primarily cultural. While the economic and cultural challenges are extremely important, the most difficult to overcome will certainly be the political issues.

### *Political Challenges*

Part of the reason political issues are paramount to the accession process lies in the fact that they so greatly affect both foreign and domestic policy matters in Turkey and current EU member states.<sup>4</sup> The Copenhagen criteria, laid down by the European Commission in 1993,<sup>5</sup> require a high degree of legislative alignment for EU member states, and in particular "stable institutions that guarantee" several things, including:

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- Democratic stability
- Rule of law
- Protection for minorities

First, the Copenhagen criteria require that any EU candidate country create and sustain institutions that guarantee stable, democratic government. Turkey, however, has an established history of authoritarianism and periods of political upheaval. The most obvious concern is the enormous influence of the military, especially in domestic politics, an influence that shows no sign of abating. Throughout Turkey's history the military has enjoyed a special role in safeguarding Kemalism and Turkey's founding constitutional principles,<sup>6</sup> including republicanism, populism, secularism, and nationalism. In practice today, the military has a significant role in both domestic and foreign policy through the national security council, a body made up of both military and elected leaders. Even proponents of Turkey's eventual EU membership find cause for concern in the fact that Turkey has experienced no fewer than four coups de etat in the past five decades (in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997).<sup>7</sup> This inflated role of the military in foreign and security affairs is inconsistent with democratic principles espoused by the European Union, which hold that the military should be subject to civilian control.<sup>8</sup> Growing out of the inappropriate influence of the military over public policy is the problem of insufficient political pluralism—political parties only exist with the tacit endorsement of the military, which has occasionally chosen to imprison and even execute leaders of outlawed political parties.<sup>9</sup>

A second major political challenge Turkey faces on its path to EU membership has to do with a pervasive lack of institutions that guarantee the rule of law. Judicial reforms, undertaken by various governments including the one currently in power, remain inadequate and fall far short of the Copenhagen criteria's requirements.<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, corruption in both private and public sectors is rampant, and both government officials and wealthy private citizens are not always held to the same legal standards as the general population. Illustrations of this problem abound, including stories of a former Prime Minister buying an apartment block in Florida with allegedly embezzled state money, high-ranking military officials awarding lucrative contracts to close family members, and illegal government-

media partnerships.<sup>11</sup> To prove to European Union member states that it has a functioning democracy with stable institutions, Turkey will have to reduce corruption and otherwise show the world that no person can disobey Turkish law with impunity.

A third aspect of the 1993 Copenhagen criteria that Turkey will find challenging to align with is the requirement of protection for minorities. Although Turkey is over 99% Muslim,<sup>12</sup> the country is highly fragmented along ethnic lines. At least 23 languages are spoken, and some of the groups are fiercely loyal to clan or tribe and have a long history of conflict with one another. The Turkish government, and especially the military elements within it, is often criticized in the international community for too many human rights violations.<sup>13</sup> This is a problem with deep historical roots, and one which will not be solved easily or quickly. Some steps in the right direction have made the problem less pronounced, including the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923 that recognized the rights of Christian and Jewish minorities. Even after the Lausanne Treaty, though, the Turkish government continued placing severe restrictions on training of clergy, property rights, and religious education for these groups.<sup>14</sup> Facing even more discrimination have been ethnic Kurds and Armenians, who were particularly oppressed under the governments of the 1970s and 1980s, especially after the PKK<sup>15</sup> launched an insurrection in Southeastern Turkey in 1984.<sup>16</sup> Ethnic Kurds make up about 20% of the Turkish population with 13 million people, making them a huge and visible minority to observers in Europe and elsewhere. Turkey has failed to resolve minority protection issues by democratic means, and Turkish negotiators in the EU accession process will be met with skepticism if they downplay the significance of the problem.

As it moves forward in the negotiation process with the European Union, Turkey also faces a major challenge in the so-called "Cyprus problem." An island nation seventy-five kilometers off Turkey's southern coast, Cyprus has been divided into the predominantly Greek South and Turkish-controlled North since 1974. Turkey invaded and declared independence for the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus," recognized only by Turkey, and has since provided a government and defense force for the 18% of Cypriots on the northern one-third of the island. The entire island gained admission to the European Union in 2004, but the

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EU body of common rights and obligations applies only to those areas under direct government control (not including the northern, Turkish-controlled territories).<sup>17</sup> The European Union has demanded a resolution to the Cyprus problem as a prerequisite for serious consideration of Turkish accession, and Turkey has refused to budge on the issue. The problem has come to the fore once again in recent months, since many observers expected to see the EU insist in December 2006 on Turkey implementing certain Customs Union provisions it signed in 2005 to open Turkish ports to Greek Cypriot ships and airplanes.<sup>18</sup> Turkey, on the other hand, was expected to refuse unless the EU eased the international embargo on Turkish Cypriots, a demand expected to fall on deaf European ears. EU Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn predicted a possible “train crash” when both parties failed to concede, but negotiators avoided this outcome by reaching a compromise: the EU Commission recommended (and the council of foreign ministers accepted) that only eight of the thirty-four remaining EU Charter chapters be closed, instead of all thirty-four of them. Because of this compromise, negotiations continued and parties avoided a potential disaster.<sup>19</sup> Still, though, it appears that the Cyprus issue is now attached to Turkey’s EU accession hopes more than ever before: the EU Commission has delayed closing any other chapters (and moving on with negotiations) until Turkey changes its position on the Cyprus issue.<sup>20</sup> This is a contentious debate, and one that will not be solved easily.

Another major political obstacle to Turkey’s possible EU accession is reflected in the popular opinion in current EU member states. Since the creation of the EU’s predecessor in 1957 there has been a constant debate about what it means to be “European,” and many different groups disagree strongly on this issue.<sup>21</sup> A large percentage of EU citizens define Europe in a way that excludes Turks, claiming that their Turkish neighbors lack a “shared European historical heritage.”<sup>22</sup> Even pro-Europe Turks admit that they, as a nation, have only had a somewhat European identity since the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the advent of Kemalism in 1923, and in fact only about 5% of Turkish territory (and population) is geographically located in Europe.<sup>23</sup> This amounts to more than a philosophical debate of what it means to be European—it has serious practical implications. Article O of the Maastricht Treaty<sup>24</sup> says that only

“European states” may seek EU membership; if Turkey qualifies, some European observers wonder, why not Russia or North African states?

Further complicating this debate is the fact that many Europeans believe that there is little need for Turkey to join, from a security and strategy perspective; Turkey already participates in European peacekeeping operations through its membership in NATO, so there may be no real motivation to bring Turkey in and jeopardize the “purity” of European-ness. To many EU citizens, Turkey is already a member in the most important ways and therefore does not need to be further integrated.<sup>25</sup> There is also an idea that Europe’s “post-Westphalian experiment” might be threatened by accepting a country with a developing economy,<sup>26</sup> even though the EU has seemed reasonably successful at integrating Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia and others.

Recent months and years have seen not only a growing skepticism of Turkish membership in EU member states, but also a parallel skepticism on the rise in Turkey. Perhaps simply a reaction to the well-established hesitance on the part of the EU, Turks now seem to be increasingly divided on the issue of EU accession. For example, many Turks feel alienated from the EU because of the European Commission’s December decision to close eight chapters of the negotiations—they feel the EU has been hypocritical and unfair by accepting Cyprus and treating Turkey differently. The debate over the Armenian genocide is exacerbating this feeling of alienation: many EU countries have had legislation proposed (and France has passed legislation) that makes denying the Armenian genocide at the hands of Ottoman Turks in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century a crime. Finally, the Armenian genocide debate as well as potential EU membership is seen by many Turks as a threat to their historical and cultural identity.<sup>27</sup>

A final important political challenge in Turkey-EU negotiations is posed by the fact that twelve new member states were only recently brought into the European Union—many of them relatively poor countries—and the EU is still working hard to fully integrate them into the customs, currency, and political unions. Challenges associated with incorporating Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria will dramatically slow negotiations with Turkey.

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*Economic Challenges*

The most daunting of the challenges Turkey faces in the accession process are primarily political in nature, but there are a number of economic challenges that will prove difficult to overcome as well. The most significant economic change Turkey will have to make has to do with increasing the pace of liberalization, opening the economy up to greater international trade, and increasing transparency. Turkey, just like many other countries worldwide, abandoned import substitution industrialization (ISI)<sup>28</sup> in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and since then the government has taken a number of important steps toward economic liberalization. Like other ISI countries, Turkey had very little trade with Europe or the rest of the world before it made the initial liberalizing steps. Though it has made a great deal of progress, the state still controls a lot of industry in Turkey, including about one-third of the banks.<sup>29</sup> Further liberalization is necessary for Turkey to have a real chance at EU accession.

The EU is also unlikely to admit Turkey until significant gains have been made in controlling corruption, which is rampant in both Turkey's private and public sectors. Unregistered activity accounts for almost 50% of employment, which greatly reduces government tax revenue and makes reliable descriptions or forecasts of Turkey's economy difficult. Furthermore, corrupt deals between government and private industry make it difficult for foreign firms to compete, which discourages badly-needed foreign direct investment.

Another economic challenge Turkey faces has to do with its enormous population and extremely high rate of growth. If Turkey were to join the European Union in 2015, as some experts have predicted might be possible, Turkey's population would be a projected 82.1 million people, only slightly smaller than Germany's expected 82.4 million. Both countries would make up about 14% of the EU's total population. By 2025 it is likely that Turkey will have overtaken Germany as the EU's largest population, at 87 million and roughly 15.5% of what would then be the EU 28.<sup>30</sup> Turkish migration to Germany would surge, raising Germany's ethnic Turk population from 2 to 3.5 million over thirty years.<sup>31</sup> Hearing these facts makes European Union citizens nervous and a little less sanguine on the idea of Turkey's accession. Finally, there are

economic challenges posed simply because of the EU's recent enlargements, including the addition of ten new member states in 2004<sup>32</sup> and then two more in 2007.<sup>33</sup> It will prove difficult in the coming years for the European Union to sustain funding necessary for structural reform in the current new member states, making the addition of another relatively poor nation even more difficult than it would be otherwise.<sup>34</sup> The reforms required to open the economies of member states and align them with EU rules and guidelines are expensive, and the EU pays most of the bill.

*Cultural Challenges*

Besides purely economic and purely political challenges, there are a number of obstacles in the way of Turkey's EU accession that are better described as cultural. Despite some ethnic and historical diversity, all 27 current EU member states have predominantly Christian populations—Turkey's 70 million Muslims do not quite fit into the religious culture. There is a widespread perception in much of Europe that not only do Muslims not fit into the EU culturally, but also that Muslims simply cannot integrate into the Western (or European) economic system. Whether based on legitimate grievances or simply on cultural misunderstandings, the generally negative image Turks have in the collective estimation of Europeans is a powerful force.<sup>35</sup> According to many international observers, this challenge will be far more difficult to overcome than any procedural requirements, Copenhagen criteria alignment, or economic restructuring. As evidence, they point to the examples of Bulgaria and Romania, which were arguably no better off economically or politically than Turkey when they joined the European Union earlier this year.<sup>36</sup>

Taken together, all of these political, economic and cultural challenges will be very difficult for Turkey to overcome if it continues down the path toward EU membership. Still, there is a chance Turkey will meet these challenges and someday attain full membership, and we should consider what might be the most significant implications if it does.

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**MAJOR IMPLICATIONS OF TURKISH  
MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN UNION**

*Political/Institutional Implications*

Another country joining the ranks of the European Union's largest states would have important second and third order effects on the organizational structure of EU institutions, especially in the European Council and the European Parliament.<sup>37</sup> The argument sometimes made by the existing large states (especially Britain, France, and Germany) is that Turkey's population is too large and it will significantly upset the current balance of power in EU institutions.<sup>38</sup> If Turkey successfully bids for European Union accession, the largest five countries would have about 60% of the vote by population in an EU with 28 members.<sup>39</sup> However, this percentage is only a 3% increase from the current state of affairs, in which almost 57% of the vote is controlled by the "Big 4" EU countries (France, Germany, Italy, and the UK).<sup>40</sup> In this scenario, Turkey and Germany would be two of the most important players in EU institutions, but neither would be able to block proposals alone or even together—they would have to join forces with a third large country. Turkey's accession would certainly make the EU more institutionally complex, but it would not significantly increase the dominance of the largest countries relative to how things stand today (it actually might slightly dilute the influence of the large states by siding with smaller, Eastern countries on some issues). It is also true that Turkish membership would definitely change the priorities and direction of EU foreign policy, redirecting it somewhat toward the South and East, especially toward the Middle East, Black Sea, and Caucasus regions.

Furthermore, it has also been suggested that Turkey might be an "awkward" member state by having few policy goals in common with other member nations, as the United Kingdom has sometimes been. Many experts believe, though, that Turkey would have more foreign and domestic policy concerns aligned with Eastern European member states, as well as with Spain, Greece, and Portugal as fellow Mediterranean nations.<sup>41</sup> Overall, the institutional changes brought about by Turkish membership would be significant, but no less manageable than those caused by other recent additions (including Bulgaria and Romania).

*Economic Implications*

While not the *most* significant implications to Turkish membership in the European Union, the economic implications are considerable and are directly related to political and security implications. Because Turkey has a well-established history of economic volatility, it would certainly bring some amount of associated risk to the European Union. Macroeconomic events in Turkey since the 1950s have been characterized by booms and busts, or periods of rapid growth interrupted by periods of high inflation, low or negative growth, and corresponding political unrest.<sup>42</sup> Even during the periods of closest cooperation with Europe and the European Customs Union (especially the 1990s), Turkey exercised a great deal of undisciplined fiscal policy—especially regarding the lack of fiscal transparency and accountability—leading to larger and larger external debt as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP). The high external debt required more borrowing from abroad, eventually leading foreign investors to lose confidence in the Turkish lira and stop buying Turkey's high-interest government bonds. In order to float its international debt, the Turkish government chose to sell its high-interest bonds in the domestic market, eventually crippling itself with an unsustainable and dangerous Ponzi financing scheme.<sup>43</sup> Turkey's economic volatility, though less of a problem today than it was in past decades, nevertheless remains fresh in many international investors' minds—the most recent crisis was only a few short years ago, in 1999 to 2001.<sup>44</sup> On the other hand, Turkey's economic indicators have improved in recent years, and many economists claim that Turkey is no more economically unstable than several other EU member states, including Portugal and Greece.<sup>45</sup> Furthermore, Turkey has begun working closely with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) since the IMF's bailout after Turkey's 2001 financial crisis. In order to receive badly-needed aid, Turkey had to accept a number of IMF-mandated, sweeping economic reforms, which are being implemented today.<sup>46</sup> Still, Turkey will have to achieve greater macroeconomic stability and lower inflation to meet the Copenhagen criteria required of EU membership candidates.

Another significant economic implication of possible membership in the EU is a result of Turkey's enormous population and the probable

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influx of cheap labor into Europe. Today, Turkey's population stands at around 70 million, a number that is growing very fast at a growth rate of over 1% per year.<sup>47</sup> Turkish migration into Western Europe has been steady since the end of World War I, peaking in the 1960s, and could skyrocket with full Turkish membership in the EU. This possible scenario makes some Europeans very nervous, especially Germans and French, who believe that a wave of Turkish immigrants would drive down wages, boost unemployment, cause social frictions, and ultimately hurt GDP.<sup>48</sup> Germany would likely feel the migration effects of Turkish membership quickest and most severely, if only because of its huge Turkish population already living there and the possibility of Turks migrating to join family members.

Though a huge influx of Turks would pose some difficult problems for EU policymakers, many economists argue that it could ultimately benefit EU countries. If migration flows mirror what has happened after other recent EU additions, Europe could expect to see an influx of about 225,000 Turks per year and an eventual total of about 2.9 million migrants. By the time all these Turks arrived, though, it might coincide quite well with Europe's expected aging population woes—Turkey's population is much younger than that of most current EU member states, and younger Turks would be those more likely to migrate.<sup>49</sup> Also, it is unlikely that migration to the European Union would be completely open to Turks immediately upon EU accession: there was a seven year transition to open borders for Greece, Portugal and Spain, and there would likely be a similar provision for Turkey.<sup>50</sup>

Besides Turkey's economic volatility and the likelihood of a large migration wave, another implication of Turkish membership has to do with Turkey's relative poverty compared to most EU member states. Turkey joining the EU would immediately negatively impact some key statistics, including overall EU GDP per capita, life expectancy, infant mortality, and others. Despite being 14% of the EU's population by 2015, Turkey would still only contribute about 2.9% of GDP, assuming an annual growth rate of 5%.<sup>51</sup> Turkey's GDP per head (at purchasing power parity<sup>52</sup>) stands at only 27% of the EU average,<sup>53</sup> and the country is also characterized by enormous regional wealth inequality. These facts all weigh heavily on

European policymakers' considerations of Turkey as a potential member.

Despite these negative implications of Turkey's possible EU membership, several important reforms Turkey has made recently bear mentioning. First, Turkey has drastically revamped its fiscal policy, establishing a central bank and taking steps to increase financial transparency and accountability. Turkey is working closely with the IMF to institute the required reforms, which has contributed to greatly increased GDP and lowered inflation in recent years.<sup>54</sup> Because of these reforms, EU accession has seemed like a real possibility and the JDP<sup>55</sup> government currently in power has claimed that Turkey is immune to the kinds of economic shocks and general turmoil it went through in the past.<sup>56</sup> The reforms have created conditions favorable to some of the things Turkey needs most:

- Sustained growth
- Large amounts of foreign direct investment (for the first time in Turkey's history)
- A stable currency
- Low inflation
- Record-high levels in the Istanbul stock market

With these successful reforms in mind, EU membership (or even continued negotiations hinting at potential membership) would "keep the ball rolling" and allow the growth to continue by doing the following things:

- Allowing for a very high return on foreign direct investment
- Utilizing Turkey's potential as a labor-rich, capital-starved country
- Increasing private sector savings
- Making government tax revenues more effective
- Providing political capital to further increase the speed of political reform.

For all these reasons, the fact is that Turkey—not the EU—would see the most significant economic implications from EU membership,<sup>57</sup> a fact often overlooked by both casual observers and political

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analysts. At least as important as the economic implications, if not more so, are the implications to Turkey and the EU's security relationships, and it is to these implications that I now turn.

*Security Implications*

Turkey's security policy, like much of its political and economic policy, is shaped by its Ottoman historical past. The Ottoman Empire, throughout much of its existence and especially at the height of its power in the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries, was aggressively expansionist and engaged in almost constant warfare. Since the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, Turkey has reacted against this legacy and tried to avoid it by acting as a power-balancing state in Europe and Asia, primarily through its membership in NATO and its bilateral security treaties with the United States and its allies during the Cold War and its more recent alliance with Israel, which keeps Turkey secure from sometimes hostile Arab neighbors.<sup>58</sup> Even considering Turkey's institutionalized security relationships with Western nations, there are three important consequences of potential Turkish EU membership that could be problematic:

1. Migration of large numbers of Muslim Turks into European countries, creating enormous challenges for immigration, customs, and law enforcement officials.
2. The Islamist movement in Turkey, which threatens Europe and the West in general.
3. Geographical risk because of Turkey's location.

First, many Europeans believe an open border with a nation of over 70 million Muslims is dangerous in itself. Because of cultural differences and the language barrier, migration of millions of Muslim Turkish-speakers would certainly create new challenges for EU law enforcement officials, court systems, and elected representatives. Second, the Islamist movement in Turkey in some ways directly threatens European citizens and Western institutions.<sup>59</sup> The political Islam movement in Turkey goes all the way back to the founding in 1923, though political Islam remained underground throughout the era of one-party rule from 1923 to 1946.<sup>60</sup> Since 1946 the movement's interests have been represented by a number of different parties, and the movement has ebbed and flowed in popularity. In general, it is best described

as an "outlet to express political dissatisfaction on the part of the geographical periphery and specific social groups and classes with grievances or different interests."<sup>61</sup> A number of factors have contributed to the popularity of the Islamist movement in Turkey, including conflict caused by regional economic imbalances (especially in the 1990s), sectarian conflict between Sunni and Alevi Muslims, and allegations of corruption in the government, which have created a sense of popular anger and encouraged Turks to challenge the state system. It is a diverse movement made up of many groups, including university students, unskilled young urban men, and some from the state-employed middle class. It also includes some upper-class members, "ultra-nationalists," and some conservative Sunni Kurds who believe that an Islamist society would be more just.<sup>62</sup> Generally speaking across all these groups, the Islamist movement in Turkey has grown as a response to social, economic, and political discontent with government institutions and policies, to include things like foreign influence, modernization, urbanization, and secularization. The rise of the Islamist movement, coupled with other factors like the emergence of "ultra-nationalism" and Kurdish ethno-nationalism, has eroded the political center and center-right in Turkey and served as a polarizing influence on the population.

When considering the Islamist movement in Turkey, it is important to remember that it is not driven entirely by religious factors—it is a much broader social and political movement of various Turkish groups unhappy with the status quo. Furthermore, political Islam has not remained as great a threat as it was two or three years ago.<sup>63</sup> The movement has lost some momentum, and current Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is probably more of an opportunist than an Islamist, which he has sometimes been labeled in the past. Today, a greater threat to Turkey's political stability is Turkish *nationalism*, a set of movements growing much faster than political Islam. Nationalism is popular, and Prime Minister Erdogan is carefully distancing himself today from any groups with ties to Islamists. Under the right conditions, this emerging popular nationalism could reveal itself in destructive and dangerous ways, for example in protests, violent demonstrations against the government, or even armed conflict. However unlikely, these scenarios temper many Europeans' support for Turkey's accession talks.



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Another important security implication of possible Turkish membership in the EU is simply that of increased geographical proximity to a number of ongoing military conflicts. Turkey not only straddles two continents, but also sits right in between three different hotbeds of international (or *intranational*) violence: the Caucasus, the Balkans, and the Middle East. Turkey shares borders with Iran, Iraq, Syria and Armenia, and is only a relatively short distance away from the former Yugoslavia. It is important to the European Union to ensure that Turkey abstains from these conflicts, and—more importantly—to keep Europe out of them, to the extent possible.<sup>64</sup> Turkey's membership in the EU might create an easy path to developing some kind of linkage between security problems European nations face in the Middle East with those they face in the Balkans, a prospect no EU leader would take lightly. Finally, Turkish accession would bring an active insurgency (besides those in regions already mentioned) right to the European Union's doorstep: the insurgency being waged by the PKK militias, which sometimes use guerrilla tactics and target (or at least disregard) civilians.

Some of the very same security implications that cause concern among EU policymakers can also be seen as having important benefits. Turkey's proximity to three of the world's main areas of armed conflict, for example, could mean some unprecedented strategic advantages for existing EU powers. Turkey sits on the Southeastern edge of Europe and could be seen as a sort of buffer zone between Europe proper and the dangerous neighborhoods of the Middle East. Turkey could also make an incredibly useful strategic partner in dealing with Russia, particularly when it comes to increasingly important issues of energy security and counterterrorism. Furthermore, Turkey's potential EU membership has important implications for the US-led Global War on Terror, an effort all European nations participate in to some degree. Turkey's membership would anchor a strategically-located Muslim ally firmly within Western institutions,<sup>65</sup> which is part of the reason the United States has remained steadfast in favor of Turkey's accession to the EU. Turkey has a huge stake in the outcome of the war in Iraq and potential fallout, making the Turkish leadership an obvious strategic partner (especially in the North, where the Kurdish majority spreads across the border into Turkey, Syria, and Iran). Many Turkish politicians and military leaders have already demonstrated a willingness to aid the

effort in Iraq, their refusal to allow military basing in Turkey in 2003 notwithstanding. Iran is another important strategic issue facing Europe and its American ally, and another area Turkish assistance could prove invaluable. Today, the quartet of the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations is coordinating engagement with the Iranians, and Turkey's membership in the EU would dramatically increase the soft power of the quartet by providing a Muslim voice and therefore increased diplomatic credibility. Turkey's participation in solving these problems is not much of a stretch—Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952 and has participated in a number of European diplomatic and military operations through its delegation to Brussels.

Another security benefit to having Turkey as an EU member state has to do with Turkey's current effort to increase military capabilities and deployment potential over the next few decades. This militarization program provides additional support for the argument that Europe should integrate Turkey as closely as possible.<sup>66</sup> Turkey has embarked on a number of new efforts at improving security relations all over the Middle East, especially with Israel and Jordan. Syria, often troublesome for European countries, supports the Kurdistan Workers Party and therefore has tense relations with Turkey. Turkey is also engaged in something of an ongoing regional power struggle (or at least a moderate rivalry) with Iran, reminiscent of old tensions between the Persian and Ottoman Empires. Military operations have increased on Turkey's Southern borders, sometimes including Turkish troops crossing into Iraq, because of the large Kurdish population there and the problems it creates for Turkish authorities. Finally, Turkey also has some tensions with Syria and Iraq over water supplies because of dam projects on the upper Euphrates. All of these factors collectively mean significant security implications of Turkey's possible membership in the EU.

It should not be overlooked that Turkey-EU negotiations have serious significance from a “clash of civilizations” perspective. Turkish membership in the “Christian club” of the European Union would translate into a clear demonstration of Western goodwill toward a skeptical Muslim world.<sup>67</sup> Turkey's presence would greatly increase the soft power of the EU in diplomatic fronts all over the world, but especially in the Middle East. The most obvious

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single example is in the Arab-Israeli conflict in Palestine, where Europe has increasingly sought to play a leading role but is often met with skepticism and resistance from Palestinian Arabs. According to former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, Turkey's membership in the European Union would have enormous psychological benefits, and it would give the Muslim world a model for the kind of government the West would like to see it develop: secular, democratic, and (mostly) free.<sup>68</sup> For Turkey, EU membership would provide stability, a partner for dealing with conflict in the Balkans, and smooth the process of further normalizing relations with Greece. All of these factors combined—migration, Islamist movements, strategic geography, the Global War on Terror, militarization, and the “clash of civilizations”—make Turkey's EU accession talks enormously significant from an international security perspective.

#### POLICY OPTIONS FOR EUROPE

Over the next several years, the course of negotiations with Turkey over EU accessions will depend to a great degree on the leadership of Europe's biggest players. France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and especially Germany will have disproportionate influence over the process, and Turkey's fate regarding its European-ness may lie with decision makers in these large countries and their ruling political parties. Because European politics and political leaders change frequently, making predictions about any important issue proves difficult. For Turkey, though, a reasonable assumption is that one of three possible outcomes will eventually come to pass:

1. Full membership and participation in the European Union.
2. Cooperation, but little or no increased political or economic integration (status quo).
3. A “privileged partnership” model, falling somewhere between the first two. This is the most likely outcome of accession talks.

##### *Full membership*

Under the full membership option, Turkey would have all the rights and privileges afforded to the existing 27 members, including common currency, participation in European military and

security forces, and open borders. EU membership would increase to 28, the institutional structures in Brussels would shift, alliances and priorities would realign, and the Muslim world would have a voice at the table where some of the most important global agendas are set and decisions are made. This outcome would be based on Europe accepting the assumption that a Turkey remaining outside the EU will eventually fall prey to Islamist movements, drift away from Europe toward the Middle East, and therefore create a dangerous risk on Europe's Southeastern border.<sup>69</sup> Europeans are unlikely to accept this assumption, and therefore this option is unlikely.

##### *No Further Integration*

A second possibility is maintaining the status quo, or Europe continuing cooperation with Turkey on both economic and security matters, but making little or no effort to increase integration and allow Turkey representation in the EU's institutional structure. Turkey is already firmly anchored in the EU in many ways: it is a member of the economic community, it participates in security operations through NATO, and diplomatic and business ties are extensive. Clearly, Turkey will continue to have a special relationship and close ties to the European Union, and both parties see this as suiting their interests. An Austrian foreign ministry official, even as he sought to slow the negotiation process with Turkey, said that “if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond.”<sup>70</sup> Because policymakers on both sides of the argument fundamentally agree that Turkey is indeed strategically important and a vital economic partner, calls for closer cooperation and increased ties will not go unheeded, and therefore the status quo option is unlikely as well.

##### *“Privileged Partnership”*

Holding the rotating presidency of the European Union until June, German Chancellor Angela Merkel argues that this is the alternative that best meets the needs of all parties involved. Although her predecessor talked of moving forward in Turkey's accession process “without delay,”<sup>71</sup> Merkel has taken the popular (in Germany) position that Turkey simply does not have what it takes and cannot

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possibly meet the requirements of EU membership, not to mention the fact that Turks simply are not European and do not “share a common historical heritage.”<sup>72</sup> George Milbradt, minister-president of the German Free State of Saxony, supports Merkel’s positions and echoes her sentiments, as do millions of Germans and other Europeans. Many believe the European Union should slow down on enlargement and instead focus on strengthening internal cohesion, an effort that bringing Turkey in would surely jeopardize. Still, even those most opposed to Turkey’s membership in the EU concede its relevance and strategic importance in Europe’s foreign policy. Further, Turkey’s EU aspirations have given the latter a great deal of influence over the former’s domestic and economic policy since the late 1950s—Europe certainly wants to maintain this influence, and a privileged partnership framework might allow it to do so.

The privileged partnership model would allow Europe to develop Turkey as a strategic partner without upsetting the delicate political balance in Brussels (on the Commission and in Parliament). Turks cannot be expected to accept this outcome with any enthusiasm in the near term, but with a carefully designed public relations campaign and diplomatic legwork, they would probably warm up to it after seeing the benefits it might offer. The privileged partnership framework might also serve as a model for other aspiring EU member states (Morocco, for example) and give them a realistic goal to work toward.

## CONCLUSION

Regardless of what the future holds for Turkey-EU relations, no definitive answer on the question of membership will come anytime soon. This is a difficult process, and it will take a number of years—EU Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso recently said negotiations may stretch over two decades.<sup>73</sup> The negotiations themselves and possible future accession of Turkey probably will not create huge effects for current EU member states, aside from the budgetary effects and reallocation of resources,<sup>74</sup> but Turks would feel the effects of membership all over their economy and security relationships. Already, though, enormous reforms are taking place all over Turkey’s economy and liberalization is moving forward at a rapid pace. Still, Turkey has a long way to go before it will be able to fully participate in the Single Market.

The main challenges Turkey faces on the path to accession are not primarily economic, though—they are primarily political, especially the need to achieve greater civilian control of the military and protecting minority rights. Considering the difficulty of the challenges Turkey faces, coupled with the vital interest Europe has in keeping Turkey around as a strategic ally, the privileged partnership model is the most likely eventual outcome of Turkey-EU accession negotiations. The world will watch with great interest, since the relationship between Turkey and Europe reflects cultural issues that affect nations everywhere. The result may provide a glimpse into what lies ahead for the relationship between Islam and the West, the world’s two largest civilizations.

## NOTES

1. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1881-1938) was the founder and first president of the modern Republic of Turkey. After WWII and the partition of the Ottoman Empire, Ataturk set Turkey on a path toward modernization, Westernization, and secularism. Today, he is revered by most Turkish people as the “father of the Turks.”
2. Barry Buzan and Thomas Diez. “The European Union and Turkey.” *Survival*, Vol. 41 No. 1, Spring (1999): 45.
3. Buzan, 45.
4. Buzan, 41.
5. Harry Flam. “Turkey and the EU: Politics and Economics of Accession.” *CESifo Economic Studies*, Vol. 50 January (2004): 171-210.
6. Flam, 171. Kemalism, for our purposes, means Turkey’s unique conceptualization of Westernization, economic prosperity, and special role in the international system.
7. Buzan, 43. Some authors and historians qualify this statistic by calling the coups “military interventions in government.” Regardless of the label applied, this is a troubling statistic.

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8. Michael C. Desch. *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, (1999).
9. Buzan, 43.
10. Kirsty Hughes. "Turkey and the European Union: Just Another Enlargement?" *Friends of Europe Working Paper*, Presented at the European Policy Summit of 17 June (2004), 3.
11. Robert Cottrell. "Den of Thieves." *The Economist*. 17 March (2005).
12. Some estimates put the number between 98% and 99%.
13. Buzan, 43.
14. Flam, 175.
15. The Kurdistan Workers Party, a leftist militant organization founded in the 1970s. As the Turkish military has sought to disrupt PKK operations in Southeast Turkey, it has often gone so far as to cause alarm in international humanitarian organizations and foreign governments.
16. Buzan, 50.
17. CIA World Factbook. Accessed: 9 April 2007.
18. Bulent Aliriza and Seda Ciftci. "Turkey Update." Center for Strategic and International Studies: Turkey Project, 18 December (2006).
19. Aliriza, 12/18/2006.
20. Aliriza 12/18/2006, 1.
21. Barry Buzan and Thomas Diez. "The European Union and Turkey." *Survival*, Vol. 41 No. 1, Spring (1999): 41-57.
22. George Milbradt, minister-president of the German Free State of Saxony, interview with author January 13, 2007.
23. Harry Flam. "Turkey and the EU: Politics and Economics of Accession." *CEifo Economic Studies*, Vol. 50 January (2004): 176.
24. The treaty signed in 1991 that formally created the European Union, changing the previously existing agreement from a purely economic one to an economic, political and social one.
25. Oya Dursun, interview with author, March 21 2007.
26. Buzan, 51.
27. Oya Dursun, interview with author, March 21 2007.
28. An economic growth strategy based on a relatively closed economy (high tariffs barriers, quotas, and exchange controls) and a strong role for the state (high government expenditures, extensive regulation, and a large number of state-owned firms). It is a practice adopted by developing nations in order to keep their currency undervalued and therefore exports valuable.
29. Robert Cottrell, "Economic Structure." *The Economist*. 6 November (2005).
30. At the time of this writing, the EU has 27 member states (including Romania and Bulgaria), and Turkey would make 28.
31. Flam, 171.
32. Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.
33. Romania and Bulgaria, added in January 2007.
34. Oya Dursun, interview with author, March 21 2007.
35. Oya Dursun, interview with author, March 21 2007.
36. Oya Dursun, interview with author, March 21 2007.
37. The effects on the European Commission would be smaller, but not negligible (according to Oya Dursun, Ph.D. candidate at the University of Texas in Political Science).
38. BBC News. "Q&A: Turkey's EU Entry Talks." *BBC.com*, updated Dec. 11 (2006).

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39. Kirsty Hughes. "Turkey and the European Union: Just Another Enlargement?" *Friends of Europe* Working Paper, Presented at the European Policy Summit of 17 June (2004): 4.
40. Philip Martin. "Europe: A New Immigration Area?" *Population Reference Bureau*, Accessed April 11 (2007).
41. Hughes, 5.
42. Flam, 200.
43. Ponzi financing, named for the American businessman who initially and most notoriously used the method, involves borrowing money from investors you never intend to repay. More specifically, early investors are repaid with cash inflow from subsequent investors, who are repaid with cash inflow from even later investors, and so on. It is a financing model that is dishonest, at best, and usually illegal and doomed to ultimately fail.
44. Hughes, 3.
45. Flam, 202.
46. Flam, 200.
47. CIA World Factbook, accessed April 16 2007.
48. Flam, 179.
49. Hughes, 4.
50. Flam, 179.
51. Hughes, 3.
52. A measure of GDP that most economists agree most accurately shows distinctions among nations' average incomes.
53. Hughes, 3.
54. GDP was sustained at around 8% growth from 2002-2004, and inflation came down from 70% to 8%, the lowest rate in 35 years. Facts taken from the CIA World Factbook and various Economist articles.
55. Justice Development Party, led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, which currently holds the majority in Parliament and the Prime Ministership.
56. Aliriza 12/18/2006, 1.
57. Flam, 171.
58. Flam, 173.
59. By "Islamist movement," I mean the collective political and social movements, both Sunni and Shi'a, that seek to institute Islamic government and (sometimes) a purely Muslim global community. Other terms that might be used include Islamic radicalism, Islamic extremism and political Islam. One term that does *not* work, however, is "Islamic fundamentalism," since fundamentalism is a term referring to a specific type of Christian (usually American Christian), and not a Muslim.
60. Nilufer Narli, "The Rise of the Islamist Movement in Turkey," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* Vol. 3 No. 3, September (1999).
61. Narli.
62. Narli.
63. Oya Dursun, interview with author, March 21 2007.
64. Barry Buzan and Thomas Diez, "The European Union and Turkey." *Survival*, Vol. 41 No. 1, Spring (1999): 46.
65. Aliriza, December 18 2006, 4.
66. Buzan, 51.
67. Aliriza, December 18 2006, 4.
68. Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Adviser. Interview with author, April 13 2007.
69. Buzan, 44.
70. BBC News. "Q&A: Turkey's EU Entry Talks." *BBC.com*, updated Dec. 11 (2006).
71. Jakob Horstmann, "A 'Privileged Partnership,'" *Café Babel.com*. Accessed: April 19, 2007.

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72. George Milbradt, minister-president of the German Free State of Saxony, interview with author January 13, 2007.
73. Aliriza, December 18 2006, 2.
74. If it joined the EU, Turkey would be the largest net benefactor of agricultural and regional subsidies under the present EU rules, receiving 12 billion Euro or more according to Harry Flam (page 203).

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